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INTRO DUCT ION 
Many industries and markets have been evaluated by economists 
using industrial organization models and principles, but a similar 
effort has not been completed for labor unions. This research paper 
intends to examine and analyze labor unions by using the framework of 
industrial organization theory. Industr·ial organization theory describes 
industries in terms of the market which does apply to labor unions. Both 
unions and industries operate in a market where ''buyers and sellers of a 
particular product engage in setting the terms of sale of that product. 111 
Mct.t pee pl c v�oul d ptc fei" nc, � deph. li11g humctn effort or 1 abor as a 
product fpr sale, but as a service . Nevertheless, labor services are 
11not immune to economic laws that affect commodities. 112 One can there­
fore view l abcr in terms of being a market. 
Price theory is also used in industrial organization analysis to 
establ ·ish "price policies" of enterprises in determining market conduct. 
This pricing theory is also applicable in studying labor unions. Unions 
provide a system wb�reby labor services are offered for various wages. 
Unions act as sellers and firms act as buyers in negotiations for wage 
determination. These procedures, such a� collective bargaining, ere 
.U Ri-:..hard C(lves, American Industry: Structure, Conduct, Per­
formance ( lev, Jersey, 1967), p. 2. 
p. 4. 
�.jDJn Paarl ber9� .:1reat Myths of Economics (New York, 1971), 
subject to economic law associated with price theory. This common 
foundation of price heory used in s.:udying unions and firms prov1des 
for some common basis in ana)yzing labor organizations within the 
industrial organization framework. However, the�e is need of demon­
strating how such an ��alysls of labor unions would provide some bene­
fit. 
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Unions have become identified with industrial firms. For 
example, automobile companies are almost synonymous \�ith the United Auto 
Workers' Union. Unions are thought of in terms of their nature of busi­
nes3. In fact, labor union growth is somewhat predetermined by 
industrial development. Nevertheless, labor unions are separate organ­
izat·ons involved in various market activities. 
A study of union organizations would reveal how extensive or how 
powerful unions are in this market. For instance, twenty-four million 
workers organized in particular patterns or concentrations provide for 
various market results. Such an analysis leads to a basis for devel­
oping general policy aspects similar to those arrived at in other 
industrial organization studies. 
OBJECTIVES 
Given some specific assumptions, theories have provided specific 
conclusion concerning unions. This type of theoretical framework, 
however ,. pro rides for a ''narrow" discussion of union activities. 
General textbo0�s written about labor unions supply an opposite approach 
by prov·;ding much material dealing with union rel ationships. A more 
comprehensive pproach, however, may be developed through an analysis 
of labor unions with industrial organization theories . This type of 
analysis allows one to s ee both the forest and the trees . 
The specific objectives of this research paper are to study: 
1. union organizations and their operations 
2. antitrust policy toward union structure 
3. strike costs 
4. union political activity 
5 .  strike alternatives 
6. wage settlements 
7. union effects on inflation 
8. predictive aspects of union 11 concentrations 11 
METHODOLOGY 
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A basic framev:ork was provided to study organizations by evalua­
ti�g two outstanding books on Industrial Organization: Bain's 
Industrial Organization and Ca e's boo , American Industry: Structure, 
Conduct, Performanc�. Furthermore, Bain's preface to his book was a 
guiding approach used in organizing this material in order to gain a 
better grasp on how an organization may be studied. 
The methodology is d-iv"i-Jcd into two parts : (1) theory and (2) 
procedure. 
Theory_ 
In attempting to describe labor organizations the pieces seem to 
fit together by focusing on the market. This model would l ook like the 
following diagram. It ind"cates interrelationships between major 
segments of our economy. 
(Macroeconomic 
goals) 
Business Firms (profits) 
9labor unions (collective 
bargaining) 
Households & Consumers (Standard of living) 
Government exerts pressure on labor unions through legislative 
acts, such as,. Wagner and Landrurn-Gri ffen. A 1 so, enforcement of these 
acts by a National Relations Board serves as an effective tool in con­
trolling union organizations. 
The Federal government's interests in labor unions stem from 
its main macroeconomic goals, such as: high employment, controlled 
inflation, growth, et cetera. rovernment has these vital interests in 
collective bargaining procedures because unions' conduct of 
wage determination, strikes, and other activities affect how well our 
market does oper .... te. Therefore, through legislation and regulatory 
boilrds, administrations seek to create a certain type of market envir­
onment varying with changes in its participants. 
Business firms also serve as countervailing powers seeking to 
eliminate union pm·1er as much as poss·ible. For instance, formu·fation of 
the American Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers 
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illustrate industrial organizations fdrmed to deal with business prob­
lems. One cannot say that these organizations were formed just to �imit 
union authority. Nevertheless, such industrial organizations provide 
for a national policy dealing with lobbying and anti-labor legislation. 
Much research is also done by these organizations dealing with abusive 
powers which unions may have acquired through ineffective labor legis­
latfon. 
A specific example of businesses seeking to limit union authori­
ty is through strike funds. Just as unions build finances for strikes, 
firms also create mutual aid packs. Recently duri�g a C.B. S. news 
broadcast a mutual aid pack between airlines was reported. Northwest 
Orieff� recei· ed mil l ·icns of dollars from two o'tt,er- air l foes during a 
pilot's strike. This type of agreement indicates cooperation among 
firms in dealing with labor unions. Such a program may result from 
necessity or a desire by firms to gain more control over their ma.rket. 
Most firms seek to limit union authority in order to maximize 
prof-its. This goa 1 may not be a primary objective of a 11 f irms, but 
this principle does have general application. Management wants control 
over its production process in order to achieve such an objective. This 
control extends to labor's wages and conditions of employment. Such 
objectives are in conflict with labor union goals; consequently, one has 
a natural situation of conflict between two powerful organizations. 
A third aspect in analysi_ of labor union organizations is the 
internal operations of unions themselves._ The breakdown of unions into 
locals, nationals, and fed�rations creates a situation in which a 
certain type of control is possibl e. ·How government operates in these 
major subdivisions determines, to some extent, the possibl e organiza­
tional activities. 
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"Concentrated" l abor unions may have a wide variation in their 
behavior toward their · members an<:I tm·1ard business firms. Large finan­
cial resources may all ow unions different al ternatives when d"scussing 
wages. For instance, union power is strengthened in industries that 
have a 1arger percentage of entire empl oyment under union contract. This 
coverage provides additional l everage in wage discussions. Local unions 
can rely on national union support financiall y and technicall y. Thus, 
many options become avaihbl e if given "concentrated" union organi-
Our final market component is consumers who wil l be either 
members of l abor organizations or non-union members. Cons umers and 
househol ds have been l abel ed as having minor or subordi:1c1te rol es. The 
pu pose of the paper is not to deny consumer rel ationship:, hut to 
establ·ish a role pl ayed by unions and to eval uate that situation; con­
sumers �nd households are members of unions but much of the roLrcine 
admin istrative work is done by paid uni Oi1 offi ci a 1 s \.;ho go 1ern ancl 
direct much of unL)n pol icy. This situation is much like a politicr1·1 
office iith indiviiual s having voting power but with el ected official s 
making important decisions on their own judgm,..nts. 
WhNi one 1 oaks at consumers and househo 1 ds, there is a 1 ack of 
organization directing their infl uence on the market or specific unions. 
Many d8cisfo�;s are made for con<.:umers by government, 1 abor unions, and 
business firms. I n  fact , some experts see these organizatio n s  as the 
") 
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main co n tend ers for rule-mak i n g authority. � I n  broad terms, these three 
dominant powers d etermine how well the market system can and does per­
form. 
Cle arly a focus o f  this model is to anal yz e  economic forces that 
determin e  union ' s  s tru cture , conduct  a nd performa n ce i r 1 the America n 
economy . This involves an examination of  two external factors : ( 1 )  
government regulati on a nd ( 2 ) busi ness firms ' managerial rights , A th ·i rd 
factor is the enviro nment of unio ns  themsel ves as a determinant  of union 
organizatio n s .  
Procedure 
This research paper will study principal sectors of  l abor un io n 
enterprises . The discussi on will be threefold deal ing with u nio n ' s 
structure ,  co nduct, and performance. 
1. Unio n  Structure 
Our method  is to view labor organizatio n s  by analysis of unio n , 
industry ,  and l egal structure. Such resul ts can be reached by looking 
at : 
a .  Un ion struct re co n cerning unio n ' s  co n centration ,  finances , 
membership ccmpetition ,  government, and growth trends. 
b .  I n du str ial concentration , labor demand ,  and industry 
a s sets which determine in part unio n  organ i zatio n . 
------ -· --
]/Li oyd Reyno l d s ,  Labor  Economics a nd  Labor Relat i ori_� (New 
Jersey, 1970 ) ,  p .  1 5 . 
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c .  The  l e gal environment of labor un ion organization dealing 
with torts, contracts, restraint of trade, and S u preme 
Court cases. 
2 .  Union Conduct 
Unions have various pattern s of behavior in adj ustin g or adapt­
i n g to marke mech anisms. Varf ous devices of union conduct are made 
possible through c ertain types of �n 1 on organization . . U nions can use 
financ�s  for var i ous purposes. Some aspects of this financial conduct 
are: 
a. Strikes - types, job rights, stoppages, costs 
bA Union Finances - poli tical cont ributions and strike funds 
3 .  Un ion Pe rfor�ance  
Union i nvolvement in market phases gives expectations of  certain 
results .  Analysis o f  this data gives some indication of union structure 
and conduct t h i ch permits such performance. P rincipa l  aspects or 
dimensi ons o f  ,arket performance are : 
a .  Strike alternatives 
b .  Wage sett l ement s  
c .  Un ion ' s effect on inflation 
d. Un i on ' s  effect on efficiency - seniority, au tomation, 
and union productivity 
BAC VGROUND OF  LA30R UN IONS 
These fol l owi n g  section s will provide a brief sketch of devel­
opments in t he unionizat i on prece ss. 
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Ideology for Col lect i ve Bargaini ng 
Co l l  cti ve bargai n i ng i s  not a n�H conce pt. H istori cal l y, uni ons 
i nvolvi ng ; huemakers appeared i n  Ph i ladelphia one hundred and seventy­
fi ve years a go. The bas i c  purpose of  thi s organ i zat i on was to restri ct 
labor su pp l y  through a ppr�nt i cesh i p  programs. Unions such as these 
prov i ded a means  o f  secu rity and h igher wages for union members . 
Moti vat i ons for joining unions today are similar to those of the 
Phil adelphia Shoema kers . Peopl e want secur i ty ,  stab i lity � emp l oyment , 
and economic gai ns. Except , & worker now must jo in � union as a con­
d i ti on o f  emp l oyment i n  many c as�s. Such an arrangement i s  known as a 
un i on shop clau se .  
Ch�n ging i ns t i tu t i ona l �.nd  economi c c ond -i t i on s  have  a l so brought 
forth th i s c all for  large l a bor orga n i zations. Thes e  l abor organi­
zat i on s  a re necessary in the Uni ted States because people are faced with 
l arge corporat i cn�  which can contro l  the li fe - and-deat h issues of the i r 
economic l i ves .  We have become a nation of employees who depend on 
wages and sal ari es ; for "about four out of every f ive pe rsons who work 
for a l i vi n g  do so by getting a j ob work ing  for an empi oyer. 1 1 4 
I ndustr ial c oncentrat i ons have provided employees with strateg i c  
market o r  techno l og i cal posi ti ons .  Th i s  i ndustri al growth has made 
pos sib l e large u n i ons in which ski l led wor kers organ ize for collect i ve 
bargaini n g  p urpose s .  
These groups estab1 i sh ing labor un i on s  were seek i ng t o  e s tabl is h 
1/Gordon Bloom, and Herbe rt Northrup, Econo�i c s  o f  Labor 
Bc l �t i ons  � I l li no i s, 1965 ), p. 3 1. 
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the i r  needs throu �h col lect i ve ba rgaining procedures. They had the 
technol ogy s kil ls needed to ba rgJ i n  with l a rge companies i n  wage deter­
mi n t kn s  . .A. u r  ion member real ·i zed , to so!l:e exten t , that h i s "rela t i ve 
ean� f o g .s deper� d  on t � ie bargaining  of  the group that he be-lon gs to. 1 1 5 
1:a rly Growt h of Labor Unions 
Some chara �ter i stics of the earl y struggle of  l a bor unions were : 
violence , wi l dcat strikes , and  lengthy strikes. Unions attempting to 
organi z e  workers were not usual ly greeted wi t h  open ar�s. Management 
res�nted any i nfringement on i ts right to manage. Uni ons were viewed 
simply as higher cos ts to the employer. Consequently unions were often 
met w i th open host i lity. 
Samue 1 Gompers was a f\. unde r c f  the modern Labor Movement . He 
provided an establi shment tha t coul d or9anize  people and prov i de them 
with representa ti on among l arg:: bus i r;e s s  fi rms . Unions then became 
The peopl e  and l a bor off i cia l s were not to be deni ed their place i n  
the eccnom� c ma rket . Un i o�s  rece i ved  l egal i mmuni ties from the federal 
go verr men t to pro:r:0 !:e: ,.1:1 i on grov,th. 
There vias  muc r: ba ck l a s h  � gainst bi g bu s i ne s s  duri r.g the Gc,r:.pe, ' s  
1 a bor organ i z at i  ... n movement. For example, bu sines s  f i rms \!Jere requ i red 
to c u rb co�b i n a t i on s  which  were in restrai nt of trade due to t he 
5/ Joan Rab i  n son , 1 1  rhe Second Crisis o f  Economi c Tht� o ry " 
( R i c h ard T .  E ·l y · i ect'i re ,  l97 1 ), p. 12. 
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en2ct�ent of the Sherman Anti trust  Act of 1890 . Such leg i s l at i on sought 
to c u r-b bus i ne s s  power over the Ameri can ma rket system . 
The first labor laws in the 19OO's dealt favorab ly  wi th l abor 
un i o r s. In 19 1 4, the Clayton Act made unions ex�mpt from ant i monopo l y 
. f . 6 1 aws to promote and protect expans i on o un ion power . The only re-
quireir.e nt i s  that labor organi z ati ons "lawful l y "  carry out the i r  "l eg i ­
t imate o bject i ves ' ' . The Supreme Court dec i si ons have not def i ned these 
terms . The refore ,  1 abor un i ons a re a 1 1  owed a very vii de range of 
conduc t J u r i  g a s tr i ke . 
A second landmark l aw was the Norris - La Guardia Act ( 1 932) .  
Th i s leg ·i s 1 a tior. provided as su�ance to labor that there woul d b e  no 
i � s u 0. r: ce  c\-f s:.1ee p i n g  i njunct� on� , , i thout notice  and without adequat� 
evi dence, for the obvious purpose  of paralyz i ng a str i ke. 7 Also i s su­
ance of inj unctions 1/Ja s s ;;e 1 1 ed out in  detail rather than through 
d i s cret i on of local j udg�s . E s sen t i Jlly , Norri s- La Guardia s ubsta n t i a l l y 
freed uni on a c ti v i ty from c0urt i nterference by providi ng th at  no peace­
fu l or  n onfraudulent union acti vity , i ncludin g stri kes and picketing ,  
was subj ect to inj unctions . 8 For an injunction to be issued , busi nesses 
must  prove defin i t i ve ly  thHt a certa · n  str i ke w1uld c ? � se de f i nite 
... arna ge s . 
The h i gh-\Amter mark i n  federal .. abor lesislat i on occurred wi th 
&l oonal d R i chberg, labor Union � cnopo ly (Ch i cago ,  1 965),  p. 79. 
l,I I b i d . , p . 32. 
e; - - Ma rten Estey ,  Th Un i ons :  Struc ture , Dev_��ment, ( 1 ◄ew York, 1967 ) , p. 1 00 .  
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passage of the Wa gner Act ( 1935) . This act is some times known as 
labor ' s  Magna Cbarta. This legislation gave worke rs the right to join 
unions without fear of  d i scharge or discrimi nation. I t  simply encour-­
aged the procedu re of col lective bargaining as a r i g ht for workers. 
However, it did not l ega l i ze the existence of  unions or _ the process of 
coll ective bargaini r , g . 9 Needless to say, labor unions ar.d collective 
bargaining a re i mpl i ed as being legitimate economi c  concerns. For 
exampl e �  businesses are required to bargain col lectively with a certi­
fied u n i on i n  " good faith " .  Also, the Wagner Act created a new agency 
dealing w i th  labor rel ations known as The Nat i ona l Labor Relations Board 
( NLRB ) . This agency was charged with administrati cn of the Wagner Act. 
for a spr�cif i c  term. Such appoi n tments  are i mportar t because of the 
board ' s  quasi-judicial function s .  I ts i nterpretat i on of law becomes the 
1 aw of the land for labor relation s unless overru 1 ed by a higher court. 
Othe r factors encou raging union growth a re numerou s. World War 
I I  saw a large inc rea se in union membership. Government encouraged 
union i sm in order to provide a steady flow of wa r materials. Also, a 
n�rger b etween the American Federat i on o f  Labor and Congress of I ndus­
tri a l  O rganizations occurred in 1956 enha ncin g u nion influence. Further­
more � bus i ness organizations �e re � i S OYg2n i zed in dealing with l arge 
l:n i ons on d nat i onal basis. 
91 b . d 01  -· I 1 • , p. 1 . 
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These three labor acts (Clayton , Norr i s - La Gua rdia , hmgner ) 
present a summary of domi nan t 1 t? ga ·e a spects concerning ear ly  l a bor 
leg i slation. They prese nt  legal pressures for a better uni on versus 
company r�l e p  Such acts present pro- l abor l egis l at i on ; h owever ,  much 
l eg i slati on has  been ant i - un i on in nature. The ideology of  u n ion vers u s  
company h a s  c hanged from per i od to per i od or even from presi dent to 
pres i dent. For e xampl e, president ia l appoi ntments to the Nationa l La.bar 
Relations Boa rd may pursue a certain presi dent i a l  po l icy. 
Hindrance  to Union. Growth 
Un i on �n ovrt } 1 u nder permi ss i ve labor leg i s � at i on ach i eved l arge 
i ncrea ses in members h i p. G reat growth in membership was d ue to uni ons ' 
penetrtt i on " into 111a s s - produ ct i on industr ies. More members i ncreased 
union finances throu gh assessed dues . Greater  finances req u i red more 
compl ex organi zat i ons  to handle such growth. The local union offi c i al 
was be i ng re pl aced by a pai d professional who was skilled in col lect i ve 
barga i ning p rocedures.  Consequently, th i s  ent i re chain of events 
created a 1 1 r� rw " market po 1er in  the form of nati onal labor unions. 
Un i on s  b2gan u s i ng th i s  n ewl y acqu i red power after World War I I . 
Stri ke s becDme a n  a�cepted pract i ce  o f  fo rc i n g  h i g h er  wages on employ­
ers . Peop l e  b0came a pprehen sive abo u t  b i g  u n i o�s . 
The Taft - :·ia rt i ey Act ( 1947 ) wa s a l eg i s l at i ve act desi gned to 
equal i ze the respon sibilit i es o f  l abo � L n i ons to those o f  the business 
fi rms . Ta ft - Hart l ey was an amen(wen t  to the Wa gner Act in o rder to 
s pec i fy unfair l abor p l a ct i ces. 
Tai t -Hb rtlcy pro v � J�d an e 1 g hty jey cco l i r ; off  per 1 od i n  ca se s  
2 9 4 6 5 1  
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of strikes involving natior al health or safety. These provis ions gave  
pres i dents power to  use injunctions in  ccping with national eme rgency 
strikes. In addit i on ,  Section 14 ( b ) of Taft- Hartley permitted s tates to 
override  union shop clauses by passage of s tate right-to-work laws. 
Also created was a Federal ediation and Conc i l i ation serv i ce ( FMCS ) as  
an independent agency to offer assistance in bargar ning disagreements .  
A second landma rk  aw was the Landrum-Gr i ffin Act in 1959 .  
The purposes were to eliminate corrupt union practices. The McC l e l lan 
committee held hearings on various union activities. Resolutions of the 
committee call ed for passage of legislation to correct financial abuses 
of unions. The Landrum-Griffin Act provided such legislation. 
Un i ons wei'e 'r "equ h ed to ma ke a y�at ·ly mandato ry f- ir: a nc i a 1  rt:: por t 
open to the public. Al so , various restrictions were pl aced on un i on 
uses of funds . [ In additi on ,  trusteeships having national uni ons ' 
control over a local union were severely limited to both time and reason s . ]  
Again one sees this backlash against bi g uni ons in the 1970 ' s. 
Public dissatisfaction aga inst service i nterruptions caused by strikes 
has grown. Mass transit systems provide people with necessary services . 
Stoppages i n  the�e  areas cause much public hardship and inconvenience. 
The pub l ic views a most everyone on strike , from his garbage 
collector to p0l i cemen. One has truckers blocking roads because of 
pol i cy ec i s i ons such as al l ocation of fuels due to the energy cr i sis. 
H 1.: a d l fo e s  1 i ke ,  " Bu tz said soaring cost of food is ca used by organized 
l abo r , "  are j u s t  some exampl es of  labor problems in our country .  
Th i s  trend aga i n st "b i g" un i ons  has many i mpl i cati ons for un i on 
orga n i zati on. S uc h  cases as  ai d to stri kes wh i ch i s  bei ng  resolved by 
the Health, Educat i on ,  a n d  Welfare Department now could mean more 
di ffi cul ty _  i n  obtai n ing wel fare for stri kers . Another pos si bi li ty 
mi ght be anti - la bor legi slati on s i mi lar to the Sherman An t i trust Act. 
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More could be developed concerning h i stori cal s ettings of labor 
union s .  Much  research has been compl eted in  such areas as wage poli cy 
and theory. A l so, proj ect i on s  and i mpl i cati ons of  uni on structure have 
been anal yzed in  n ume rou s j ournal arti cl es . Labor uni ons have been 
researched a s  to 1 a ho:-- ' s deve 1 opment and s_i gn i fi ca n ee to bus ines s fi rms. 
However, a fr2.mework to analyze l abor organ i zations in terms of 
key components ha 3  r; 0 t  bee(; for rr:ul&.ted. T iH ie l in d tat ·i c,n s o f  the resea n  ..h 
prevent a compl�te ana l ys i s  of labor un i on's structure, cond uct, and 
performance. Nevertheless, enough  in formati on i s  provi ded as to eval uati ng 
un i on performance .  The structu re a n d  conduct of labor un i ons relate to 
performance goals . The next few topi cs deal wi th some s peci fi c aspects 
of labor uni ons . 
CHAPTER I I 
STRUCTURE 
The s tructure of l u bor unions can be analyzed by examin ing three 
d i fferent components. A 1 \bor organization i s  affected by i ts i nternal 
operations, industr i al character i stics , and l egal statutes wh i ch provi de 
the rul e s  for c oll ective barga ini n g .  Con sequently ,  topic areas will 
con s i st of ( 1 ) labor  o rganizat i ons, (2 ) i nd u stri3l  organizat i ons, and 
( 3 )  l ega l  env : ronment . This framework includes the interact i on of 
government, indus try , u nion l ead�rs and meri�bers. 
UN ION  ORGAN I ZAT IONS 
The very nctti1 re of 1 abor ur.  ·i em s promotes a certa ·1 r, type of  
o rgan � za t. i on .  Structural charactGr i st ks  o f  members h i p ,  concen tt 'a t i on ; 
growth ,. cc;:1pc- t i t i cn , and f i n a.nc'::.:S descr i be and in some c a se s  qu 2. n tHy 
the s tructure of  l a �or u n i c 1 s . Th i s s egfficnt analy��s  m� 1y nf t��se  
character i sti c s . 
Union Members h ·i p 
Tot--: 1  u n i on mc1:�be rs h � r; ha.:.)  i n cre� sed from 9 mil 1 i cn i n  19!;. f' to 
2 1  m ill ion i n  1 9 70. 1 E s t i �ates now p l ac� membe rs t i p n ear 24 mi l ! i on 
u nion memb�rs . S u c h  rowt h ,., c c. urs fron 1  "i n c rea sE" �  i n  emp l oym nt i n  ma.j 0r  
industr i e s  of  o u r  market . Un i on S �" 'JP c l  - u se s  p rovi de  t h a t s uch vmrkers 
must j o i n  a un i on after bei ng h fred. ' ' By latest  est i ma.l. e s , a . o u t  7 5  
· llrhe ,. mer i can ln1arac , 93rd . ed i t-ion , ( 1ew York : G ra s set and  
Dun l a p , I nc . , 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 24 1. 
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percen t of  workers in  contracts covering 1 , 000 or more worke rs each are 
s u bject to un i on s hop  p rov i si ons. 1 1 2 
Two , ·ecent f�ct0rs h a ve greatl y contr i buted to un i on membersh ip 
growth.  Pre s i dent Kennedy , c!ur ing the 1960 ' s ,  a 11 owed gove rnmen t em­
ployees to form l abor uni ons. Before such l egi slati on ,  governmental 
employees ·110 �  ... e n0n - un i J n 1 2ed . Another i mpetu s l:as been an increase i n  
orga n i zat f o 1 1 c� l  act ·i v-i t 'i e s  condu,: ted by powerful un i ons. Un i ons , by the i r 
s heer s i ze �  �ere ab l e to compel f i rms to h i re on l y  un i on person�el . For 
i ns tc: n.::c � teams ters c�ce orga n i z ed i n  many lav·gc c i t ies ha ve controll ed 
the h ir ing pract i ces o f  vari ous truc k i ng f i rms . 
Effects o f  uni on growth can b� s � cn �Y l oo�i n g  at the s i ze o f  
spec i f i c un i o� s .  J u st  a p a rt i a l l i s t i ng of l a rge un i ons  wi th 100 , 000 
members or more i s  g i ven. The idea i s  to &cqua i nt one wi th some of the 
larger uni o n s . Names l i ke Woodcock ( Un i ted Auto Wo rke rs ) ,  F i tz simmons 
( tearr:sters ) s and Abel (Steelworkers ) are we ·1 1 - known to the publ i c  
because t i  e se  �n i ons ' act i · i t i e s reach headl i nes . Neverthe l ess , t here 
are many other powerfu l  un i on s such a s  those i n  Table 1. 
2/1't1,;) i.�ten E� 4.0.v .. Tr. 1 e  Un 1· on s ·. " tru ,... 1 ! • re D e l  • ' } 1 ::i ... 1 .., _ _  � I  .J · '- • �  , ev  opn: n L.  ano  , · (l nage -
ment  ( New Yark , 1 967 ) , p .  79. 
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Tabl e 1. National and International  Un i on Mernbersh i p, 1 964 and 1 970 . 
Uni on Membe rs ·,.. 
�-70 1964  
1 .  Teamsters ( I n d )  1, 829 1, 507 
2 .  Automob i l e  worke rs ( I nd ) 1 , 486 1, 168 
3. Steel wor kers 1 , 200 965 
4 .  Electri cal ( i BEW ) 927  806 
5 .  Mach i ni s t s  865  808 
6. Carpen ten: 820 760 
7. Reta i 1 c l erk s  605  428 
8.  L a borers ' 580 4 " ? ..J ._ 
9 .  Meat cutters 494 34 1 
1 0 . Hotel & re staurant 46 1 445  
Source : The  American Al manac, 93rd. edi tion , 1 9 73 , p. 242. 
* In thou s and s 
Union growth has not been so  cohes i ve when studyi n g  me�be rs h i p 
in i ts national organizat ion , the A. F. L .  - C. I. 0. In 1368 , the Un i ted 
Auto Workers and Teamsters wi thdrew from this A. F. L. - C . I . O. Feder­
ation. An a 11 i a nee for 1 abor action was O l 'gcni  zed a s  a by•- product. The 
four members of  the A . L. A. - the Auto workers , t�ams ters , chemi cal 
workers, and d i str i buti ve wo rkers - al l were p reviou s l y affi li ated wi th 
the A. F. L. - C . I . O. The federati on l ost those  un i ons bu t revenue wa s 
mainta i ned by usi ng a tax i ncrease  among aff i l i ate members. Hov-12ver, 
s uch a brea k re presents a ser i ous  blow to uni ons ' national pol i cy .  The 
auto and teamsters u n i ons were not onl y the l argest uni ons , bu t a l s o 
represented pos s i b l e  technologi cal and s tra teg i c  ma rket pos i t i on s . The 
teamsters' union , for example , can v i rtual ly stop the t rans portat i on of 
vital p roducts . E ven a stri ke by independent t ru c ke r s  i n  l.974 cJ. Ll sed  
shortage s of  many prod ucts.  Thus , s uch dominant  u nions greatly in ­
fluence economic acti vities and have cons i derable beari ng on govern­
mental deci s i ons . 
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N�verthele s s, key un i cns have domi nated Amer i can union member­
shi ps . The six and ten large st  un i on s  are not new, and in fact, are 
virtua l ly the same a s  they were half a century ago and i ri 1964-, the six 
l argest un ·i o � accounted for over s i x  m 'i l l ion members . or 33 . 5  percent 
of total Am�rican u n i on members hip, and the ten l arge s t  unions accounted 
3 for 43 percent of  total members hip . 
The onl y  c hi:tn ge i s  the eli mi nat i on  of the Uni ted Mine i·lorkers 
from the top s i x, wh i ch res ulted from a decl ine  i n  the coal mi n i n g  
coal mini ng i nd � s try vih i ch wi l l  eventual ly re s u l t in i ncreased member­
ship for the United M ine �orkers 1 Un i on. 
These key u nion s  have brarched out on an indu str ial bas i s  for 
the i r  merr:bers � i ps . For instance, the United Auto Workers are also 
organ i z ed i n  aeros pace and agricultural implement manufacturing .  Other 
un i ons have also fo l l owed sim i lar strateg ie s  in organi z i n g members . 
Unions have t i n  add i t i on ,  cros sed i ndustrial boundarie s i n  membership 
drives.  
A typ ica l  u n i on ized  men :ber i s  v1h i te ,  male, and blue-collar . He 
wi 1 1  probabl y l i ve i n  one of f i ve state s :  r�ev., York, Ca 1 i forn i a , Pennsyl -
van ia ,  I l l i no i s ,  G r  Ohio ;  for these s ta tes a ccount for approxi mate l y  
3/�art- en  [ c_, tcy, AP r 1· t  p 3�, i ' .., -re ,.., • '"' • , • • 
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hal f of  th e total United States '  union membership .
4 
Con centration 
Unions h ave various concentration level s i n  different indus­
tries .  The three pri mary u ni onized industries are meta l  and machinery, 
trans por tat i on,  and construction. 5 Such observations are made from data 
on union members  compared to the p�rcentage of tota l  empl oyment in i n-
dustries.  Tabl e 2 ,  however, does not confi rm the percentage of 
workers under union contracts . Union membership total s are not iden ­
tical wi th co l l ecti ve barga i ning coverage. This chart rel ates where 
union membe r s hips a re strongest in major economic se ctors . 
Tab l e 2 .  U n i on Membe rs h i p , 197 0 .  
---------------------:---::--=-------=--=-- -=---As P ercentage of Total 
Manufacturing 
Transportation,  Ut i l i ties 




Min i ng 
Agri cu l ture 
Number 
7 , 600 , 000 
2 , 527 ,000 
2 , 103,000 
1, 948,000 
1 , 709, 000 
1 , 2 55 , 000  
205 ,000 
46,000 




39. 2 %  
10. 2 �� 
22. 2%  
35. 7% 
2 . 4% 
Source : " From Cen s u s  n gures : Where Unions are S trongest, "  U . S .  
News & Wn r 1 d 3eport , December 18, 1 972 ,  p .  98. 
YMa rten E s t�y , o p . cit. , p. 9. 
51 '.S f�e  al s0  �=xecut i ve Office o f  �h � Presiden t/Office of the � a na gc­
ment  and Sudqet , �: t 0 r' r. ard In u s tr i a l  C l a ss i fica t i on Ma nual ( Wa s h i n gton �  -
0 • C • : U • S � Govt;! r n :-'. 12-n t Pr i n t n g Of f i c e , 19  72 ) • 
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The Burea u of Labor Statistics made a rough es timate  of t he  
degree o f  union organizations. I t  accounts for members h ip in areas 
outside  of t he  United States and al so the extent  of union coll e ct ive 
bargaining coverage. I n  addition, this foll owing table in compl ete form 
covers s ome thirt y-five different industrial groupings . .  The data pro­
vides an indication of the extens i ve coverage union contracts have with 
respect to indus trial bargaining agreements. Also, the proportion of 
production workers covered by col lective agreements give some rough  
estimates for comparison. These  es timates are in Tabl e 3 pri nted 
from the Dire ctory of National and I nternational Labor Unions in 
the United States , Bul letin 1668, U. S. Department of L abor, BL S, 
1970. 
Tabl e 3. Uni on Members hip as Covered by Coll ective Agreements, 1970 .  
I .  75 percent and over I I .  50 percent to less than 75% 
1 .  Transportation 7. Electrical machinery 
2. Transportat i on equipment 8. Pri mary metals 
Con tract constru ction 9. Food & kindred p roducts ,J • 
4 .  Ordnance 10. Mining 
5. Paper 1 1 . Apparel 
6. Petroleum 1 2. Manufacturing 
Source: Richard Rm·1an, ed. , 1 1 The Unions: Structure, Functions , and . 
Mernbership, 1 1  Readings in Labor E conomi cs and Labor Relat i ons , 
1972 , p. 1 96. 
Nat i o�a l concentrations ' ratios present aggregate data con­
c erni ng u nion power. These  ratios wil l probabl y understate the amount 
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of mo nopol y in actual regional and/ or l ocal geographic markets . For 
exampl e , the tea msters • union , which is the l argest and most powerf�l 
u nion , expended tremendous pressure towards trucking firms at  local 
u nion - 1  eve 1 s .  The  very competitive nature of the true king industry 
provides  for l ittl e resistance to a union such a s  the teamsters. 
C i rc umstances in other industries however may over- represent union 
power. United Auto Workers , because of industrial concentrat i ons ,  have 
a weaker bargaini ng position than lesser concentrated unions . Thi s 
uni on operates in an industry dominated by four large corporations: 
General Motors ,  Ford , Chrysler, and American Motors , which account for 
92 percent of the val ue of shipments i n  the motor vehicle  i ndustry. 
However, the United Auto HoH.:ers have over 75 percen t  of their  pro­
duction workers covered by  cc l 1 e ctive agreements. Conseque�tly , the 
auto workers • un i on  possesses a 1 1 advantage because of its monopo i y ,  but 
al so faces a d isadvantage by reas on of  the countervailing power present 
on the empl oyers side .  
Concentrated unions have a congl omerate type of structure. At 
the union l evel one s ees local , nati onal , a nd federations formed . 
Labor ' s n ationa l organization , the A . F. L .  - C . I. O. ( American Fede�ation 
of Labor & C ongre ss of Industrial Organizations ) ,  for instance , accounts 
for a l arge percent of union membership. " In 1964 , 1 28  of the 188 
national and international unions belonged to the A . F . L .  - C . I. O .  - ­
their cornbf o ed membership was 15 , 150 , 000 or nearly 85 percent of total 
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uni on rnem ersh i p. 1 1 0 Also , exampl es ha ve a l ready been presented d em-
onstrat i ng that un i ons  cross i n dustr i a l  boundari es i n  col lect i ve bar-
ga i n i ng. 
The exte11sive nature of cone n trated u n ions ' act i v i t i e s  is 
di ff i cu l t to desc r i be. Cooperat i on amon g uni cn s  extends beyond forrna 1 
aff i l iat i on. Loca i  un i cn s  i n  c i ti es may s upport one another d u r i ng a 
strike. Als o � un i on as s i st nee is prov i ded na ti onally. An example was 
the boycott o f  Fa rah r:l othe s i n  whi ch the manufac � urer was for-ced to 
agree to uni on i za t i on i n  the face of pres s ure from u n f ons  i nvol ved  i n  
segment s  or other st ges  o f  manufactur i n g a nd market i n g c f  Farah Clothes .  
These compl ex arrangerrents and mul ti- i no u stri a 1  un i on s  demon s t ra te the 
cong l omt';lrate n a tl. re 0t  un i on . - . 
G rowth Trends 
Un i on membersh i p as a percentage of the total labor force has 
declined through th e years . A bottom was reached dur · ng the  ear·l y 
1960 1 s and since that t i me un i on members hip has s hown some incre a s es.  
However , thi s decl i ne in union membershi p has given i mpetu s to ta l k  of 
union stagnat i on or deteri oration. Tab l e 4 reports the growth pattern 
of uni on member s hip . 
6/Marti n Estey, op . ci t . , p . 35. 
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Total Uiion Members h i p  
Excl udin g Canada 
17, 490 
17 , 1 1 7  
16, 524 
17 , 299 
1 7 , 940 
18, 367 
18 � 9 16 
1 9, 38 1  
Pe rcent Uni on Members 
of Total Labor  Force 
25 . 2  
24 . 1  
22 . 2  
22. 4 
22 . 7  
22 . 7  
23 . 0 
22 . 6 
Source : Richard Rowan, ed . ,  Readings in Labor Economic� and Labor 
Relat i ons, 1972, p. 191 . 
Un i on c7fi c i a 1 � d e  have legitim�tc cc�ce rns about t�� 1 r  mt�tc r-
ships . �embership problems resul t from fu ndamental changes in the 
economy . The Un ited States has become a service produc i ng na tion . For 
instance, transportation, publ i c  utilities, trade, f i nan ce, i nsurance, 
real estate, and other service industries have s hown treme�d ous growth . 
I n  fact, by 1 980, close to 7 of every 10 workers are projec ted to be in 
service industries ; 7 whereas, the goods producing industrie s  s uch as 
manufacturin g ,  contract construction, mining, and agricu l t u re have 
decl ined in percentage of tota l employment .  Consequently ,  the groups 
being easiest to un i onize are decl ining in importance in the economy . 
Large industri al centers no  l onger assure growing union me�bershi ps . 
S a.lo.ried workers a re the new dominant l abor fo r-ce . For exampl e ,  
ZIRi ch ard Rowan, er! . ,  1 1 Empl cyed Trends Project i ons and  I n:r-1 ·i ­
cation s, 1 1 Be a dings in La bor Economi cs and La bor Relati ons ( Ill in e � s ,  
1972 ) , p .  24 . 
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wh i te- coll ar j obs  ma ke up the fastes t · growing occupat i onal group. This 
group i s  now eve, larger than blue- collar oc cupations , with wh i te-col l ar 
workers occupyi ng 38, 892, 000 jobs , or about 48 . 2  percent of the total 
employment compared to 2 7 , 744 , 000 blue-collar workers ,  according to the 
Bureau of Labor Stati s tics , 1972 . 
I n  wh i te-col lar occupations ,  these  \vorkers identify with manage­
ment. This h inders organizational attempts by unions . Also, there i s  
diffi. culty i n  organi zing these workers of geograph i cal diversity. 
Other groups di fficu l t  for u nion organizers to reach are south­
ern textile, s ervi ce, and s hops under 200 workers . These  grou ps , s uch 
as service workers , do not organi ze  us i ng traditional methods .  For 
new orgarl iz i ng approac hes are n eeded to meet changing economic t rends.  
Government employees have also experienced a ra p i d  ris e in 
n umbers. But un i on growth potential for government employees seems to 
be li mited to help received by the government. This fact , coupled \\fith 
the no- strike cl a use  of goverr ,ment employees , tends to ces troy the so­
ca  1 1  ed "big weapon" of unions.  
Despite union organizing problems , u nions are more powerful now 
than a t  a ny other perit'd. Membership losses have eccurred in manufac­
turing i ndu stri es s uch as auto workers , s teelworkers ,  and machin i st s . 
However, union membership in service industries s uc n  as teamsters ,  
electrical  vwrkers , and retail clerks has  s hown large gain s . " New" 
unions are als o  showing progress in organiz ing wh i te - c ollar worke rs . Fo r 
i nstance, tea cher u nions a re experi encing more effec t i veness  in c0l l ec­
t ive ba rga i nin g .  
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Labor un i on decl i ne i s  represented i n  te rms of n umbers rather 
than 'i n pm1.Jer. "The d i re forecasts regard ing union " stagna t i on " ha ve 
been la i d  to rest. 1 1 8 Uni ons in manufacturi ng i ndustr i es have better 
f inances and  organi z�t i ons th an ever be fore ; however , bureaucracy may be 
a real d � f , i culty fac i ng un ions. Inadequate organi z i ng _ efforts _ and 
faui ty i nternal p rac t i ces have prevented union s from expand i ng the i r  
coverage of  d i fferent groups of workers. Un i on offi c i al s  are promoted 
from w i th i n  the organ i zati on and sel dom recru i t any outsi de execut i ves. 
Consequently, new i deas and people are needed i n  order to i nsure uni on 
progress. 
Un ion Gover nment 
Union government wi ll be d i scus sed i n  terms of the �elat ionsh i ps 
among three major levels. Union organ i zat i ons can be termed as a 
federat i on ( A. F. L. - C. I. O. ) ,  nat ional, or local uni t. Each un i on l eve1 
h as spec ifi c functi on s  a nd powers. 
The basi c relati onsh i p  between a federati on and other members i s  
simi la r to that  o f  the Un ited Nati ons to i ts member n at ions. Nat i onal 
and local un i ons send members to convent i ons whe re var i ous proposa l s  are 
voted on dur i ng the meeti ngs. The resulti ng resolut i ons a re not, how­
eve r ,  bi nd i ng on the federati ons' consti tuents. I n  th�ory , the federa ­
ti on ex ists,  because of nat ional a n d  l ocal un i ons ' pre rogati ve - - - s imi ­
la r to the s i tua t i on i n  the Un i ted  Na t i on s .  Neverthel ess , much - pressure 
81R i c hard Rowan, op. cit. ,  p. 174. 
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is ap p l i ed to force adherence to federa tion p olicy. 
A pr i ma ry fun  ct i on v f the fed er at i on i s po 1 i ti ca 1 . Various 
organizati ons o f  t he  federation are , ,ark i n g at s �a � e  and national l eve l s 
to lobby fer u� i on �o l i c i 2 s .  Another goal of federation po l i cy is 
re. earch ·i r. gett i ng la bor ' s  v i ev1po i i".t recognized . .  Al s o, a coordi . a tir.g 
funct i on between d i fferent  unions is e s s ent i al to federation pol icy . For 
exampl e ,  information is exchanged among sever�l uni ons as to the best  
1ay to  achieve union goah. 
A second major segment of l abor government is the national 
union .  Some 188 national unio�s dom i nate  un i on dec i s i on s . In many 
case s , local unions  are s u bject to po l icy decision s  of  national u n i on s . 
t i on 5 . 
National unions, by concentrating power of negotiati ons a t  :r ,E i r 
l vel , tend to reduce the i mportance and independence of local leader ­
sh i p .  Mos t  l ocal unions can not decl are a str i ke without nat i on a l  
exccut i v8 board approval. A str i ke called wi thout  such a pprovd1 depr i ves  
s tr i �c r s  of b enefi ts  and other types of aid. 
A typ 1 ca 1  ba r91 � n i ng agreement is reached by national - bargai ne rs . 
Nat i on a l  u nion s bargain for many l ocals. This type of bargaini ng i s  
noted a s  multi un i t ; s uch a type of bargaining has advantages for both 
emp l oye r and unions. There is simpl ification of contracts and better 
barga i ning s kills on both sides. A price is, howe ver, paid by fixi n g  
wage levels for a part i cu l ar industry without  substant i a l regard to 
particul a r  firms or l ocalitie s .  
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Multiun i t  b argaining c an deve) op  i nto wh at is known as pattern 
bargaining. This is a procedure by which gains in one industry are a l so 
sought in other industries. It is a situation where wage increases 
granted for auto workers are also demanded by steelworke rs . There is 
some evidence  of this changing wage structure among different indus ­
tries. For instance, some economists are of the opinion that "we have 
reached the state where a limited number of key wage bargains effec­
tively influen ce the whol e wage structur� of the A.m2ricai1 economy. · 1 9 
The third level of organized l abor is the l ocal unions. As 
already noted, most decision making authori ty i s  ta ken av-;a y by the 
national union. National unions can disband � � u s pend j or superv i se 
loc.a 1  un i on fu nc t i un5.  I n  some c ases,  lucal o ff "i (; e; f"� ma y bt ren ,oved 0y 
nation al . executives without the consent of local membe rs. 
Local unions  function where workers live with agreements made by 
nation al unions .  At this local level, agreements are administered and 
interpreted. Any difficulties of employment are resolved through gri ev­
ance procedures among employer and local un i on officials . 
Government at locals is democratic in n at ure but members prefer 
to let paid e xecutives run the union. These pa i d  offi cials further draw 
power a way from union workers. A typical membe r tends to j ud ge h i s 
un i on by its effect on his pocketbook. Thus, a union receiv i n g sub­
stanti al wage incre ases has a free h and in assi st i ng union officials in 
maki ng decisions. 
9/ Bl oom and . l orthrup, Econom i c s of Labor Re l ati on s  ( I l l i no i s , 
1965 , p .  389 . 
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Only 10  or 15 percent of  the  members may turn out for an 
ordinary un i on meeting, and even such critical decisions as el ection 
of  officers or the  ratifi c at ion of a proposed col l ective- 10 bargain i ng settl ement may bring out a bare majori ty of members .  
Union Compet i tion 
Union organizations start at smal l l evel s and usual l y  expand 
from such  boundaries. Most unions  begin on eith er a craft or industrial 
base .  Craft uni ons organize workers in particular occupations or 
trades ,  rega rdl e ss of industry . Whereas, industrial unions draw al l 
workers i n  vo 1 ved \'li thin an industry. 
Obv i ous l y � u nions today are not purel y craft or i ndustrial in 
nature . The once d i s tinctive union cl assificat ions  have become bl urred 
due to c hang i ng t�chnol ogy a nd industr i al practi ces. Lhan g 1 n� processes 
and techniques of production have created unskil l ed jobs from ski l l ed .  
I n dustrial unions , such as the Uni ted Auto Workers, are  organized in 
other industries ard c rafts to meet changing economic trends. 
Further competition for union members has been provided by 
legislati ve a cts, a s  were previ ousl y discussed. Grou ps of workers were 
given the � i ght  to bargain coll ect i vel y through representatives of thei r 
own choos i ng . Consequentl y ,  members, not unions , woul d deci c2  who 
shoul d repre s ent the �11orkers. This situation provid2d for rnu ;.-:h rai ding 
among un i ons . Excess i ve competit i on among u nions res u l ted i n  need l es s 
union a(:tiv i t i e s . Un i on officia l s spent th eir organ i zing 0. fforts i n  
a ttrac ting membe�s f �cM other un i ons .  Therefore , new groups of  workers 
lG/Richard btey ,  op.  cit . , p. 49 . 
were not being organ i zed , but merely �reated internal fi g hts among 
exi sting unions . 
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The A . F . L .  - C. I . O .  merger in 1955 attempted to elimi nate 
compe�ition among unions . Eac h  uni on was provided excl usive j uris­
d i ction base d on historical data . Memberships under unions were also to 
remain i ntact as of the merger date . Union officials woul d rel y on 
uni on charters and other pertinent information to estab l is h  j uris diction 
of un i ons . Also, a no- raiding agreement was signed for affi liates of 
the A . F . L . - C . I . O .  This proposal meant that unions coul d not actively 
seek to gain members from other unions or accept their membe rship. 
Exclusive j urisdiction is more philosophy  than fact. Union 
boun�a�  li nes il rG not cl ear . Union s e ven rew�ite their charte rs to 
i ncl ud e $ pecific groups . Con flicts also result in unions when job 
combinations can require workers from two d i fferent unions . 
Cooperation is voluntaril y requested among unions as to bar­
gai ning relationships in organizing workers . If disagreements occur 
among unions , the Cole Board ( impartial group) attempts to settle 
d i fferences .  The Cole Board i s  an impartial group that attempts to 
settle raiding and j urisdictional d isputes among affil iates of the _ 
A. F . L .  - C . I . O . It p rovides a procedure b y  which unions can solve their 
internal d i fferences among themselves .  In fact, the National Labor 
Relations Board al lows the Cole Board to first settle the dispute . Then, 
if no agreement is reached, the disagreement becomes a case for the 
government  to solve . The National Labor Relations Board then attempts 
to  settl e this competition among unions. 
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Uni ons affi li ated wi th the A. F.L. - C. I. O. are restri cted in 
organ i zi n g members. Th i s  means that members di ssati s f i ed for any reason 
w i th the uni on representing them h ave only three choi ces: ( 1 )  a l ter  
uni on poli c i es, (2 )  decerti fy thei r present union, or ( 3 )  s upport a uni on 
not affi li ated wi th the A. F.L. - C. I. o. 1 1  Such alternati ves, for 
vari ous reas ons, are not practi cal. Internal labor uni on reform to 
alter poli ci es i s ,  at best, a slow process. Decis i ons  concerning union 
pol i cy are made in the h i gher levels by uni on offi cers. The sec ond 
alternati ve would d eny workers a uni on to protect thei r economi c po s i ­
t i on. Also ) attempts to decerti fy present uni ons through the Nat 1 ona 1 
Labor R�lati ons Board provi sions are seldom successful. The th i rd 
c hoi ce woul d usu a 'l l y  mean to accept a uni on expe'll €CJ trom t ile A .  i- .  L .  -
C. I. O. Uni ons not affi l iated wi th the A. F. L. - C.I.O. are often lackin g  
i n  necessary resources to bargain effecti vely wi th l arge industri al 
corporati ons . Consequently , competi ti on among unions i s  for new members 
not from groups a l ready organi zed. 
Fi nances 
Labor unions are substanti al organi zations i n  terms of finances. 
Large funds are h eld by � occtl , i n termediate, nati onal , and federated 
uni ons. Such funds c1. re needed to perform comple ;{ barga ini n g  n egoti a­
ti ons. Strike funds and legal assi stan�e requ i r� large outl ays . The 
fol lowing table i ndi cates fi nances hel d by th e ten lar-gest r, ati onal 
· 111 Bloom and Northrup , op. c i t . , p. 82 . 
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unions. 
Tabl e 5 .  Union Total Receipt and Net Worth (in Mill i ons of Dollars) , 1963. 




El ectri ca  1 ( IBDn 
Machinists 
Carpenters 
Retai l Cle rks 
Laborers 
Meat Cutters 
Hotel and Restaurant 
Net Worth 








Tota l Receipts 
$ 2 2 . 3  
46 . 2  
56 . 0  
62 . 4  
19 . 2  
16 . 0  
7 . 6  
4. 6 
Source :  . Bloom and Northrup, Economics o f  Labor Rela tions, 1965. p. 121. 
Note : Dashe s  i ndicate no  data reported. 
Nat i onal uni ons a re mui ti-milli on 001 lar conce rns admi ni stered by 
top executives . Most income i s  received through dues and in i ti ati on 
fees from the i r  members . Re serves of  funds are als o invested i n  sec u ri­
t ies suc h  as government bonds . T hese three so u rces prov i de nat i on a l 
unions with their operating budgets. Reven'l e from members  i s  l i m i ted , 
however ,  by maj ori ty vote on any due s ' i ncrea s e. Also, excessi ve or  
discriminatory fees by unions are illegal under various legislative 
acts. In addi tion, unions usual ly manage welfare and reti rement funds, 
whi c h  are large f i nancial accounts . 
An exampl e o f  the  fin anc i a l  portfo l io i l l u s t ra t i ng the maj or 
i ncome a n d  expendi t u r e se gments of a nationa l uni on  such as  the Un i ted 
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Mine Workers i s  re ported in Ta b l e 6 .  The compl ete deta i l s  of finances  
are not availabl e �  but  acts such as Landrum- Gr iffin prov i de for compl ete 
accountabil ity o f  -f i na r. ces. 
Tabl e 6. Un"i ted  t1 i ne Workers ' Finances. 
-----------•-- --- ----------------- ---�--- --
F i nar. ces  r·:�- fare a nd Ret i rement 
I Fund Finances 
I ncome : 1 3  mi 1 1 i • ·• n  1 97 1 ,  '. nc l ud i r :1-�cei pts : 1.98�1 i 1� i on 
3. 7 m i l l i on from �2m�e r-
s hi p dues , 5 . 8 r. ; 1 -� f r �  fro rn 
d i v i dends and i ntere s t. Expenditures :  232  min i o n  
0 u t g  o : A 1 mo s t 2 4 m i  11 i on , 4 . 6 to 
l s ett l e lawsuits , �755 ; U•n i n  
I 
Rf:sr.:ve s :  79  mi l l ion 
offi cers ' sa  1 ari es  ..:. , iG 
expenses ; 2. 4 mi l1 i Gn i n  
empl oyee payrcl l  and re l a ted 
expenses .  
Tota l  As sets : 63 mil l ion 
Source : U. S .  News & Worl d Report , January 1 ,  1973 . 
The aggregate f i n a n ce s  o f  uni ons are ever. more impres sive. Na­
tional uni on s  i n  1970 made 17  mi l li on dol l ars in l oa n s  to o ther unions . 
One can al s o  determi ne where money decis i ons are made . Nati on�l uni ons , 
of some 190 in number ,  have control over l ar ge as s ets . Whereas l ocal 
unions , s ome 75, 000 in number , have impres s i ve as sets  in total , but 
i ndiv i d ual union f i nances are small in compar i son  to nat i on a l  un i o n s. 
The io l l o\ 1 i n g  ta ble records fi nancial data o f  un i ons. One notes that 
national u n i on l oan s have increased  in · s i ze substanti ally . 
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Tab l e 7 .  L a bor Un i on s  
o f  Don ars ) . 
rin ancial Data, by Type of Un ion ( i n M i l l i on s  
Nat i ona l  Un ion s  
* 1 9t8-- 19 7 0  ! 
Tot :..1 f:.. s :s e :  
Lo;J r. :  :•lad e  
s 1 ,  0.37 . 6 1 , 068 . 1 
i 7 . o  1 6 . 7 
·-·--· -
I ntermed i ate Bod i e s 
* 1968 1970 
1 7 1 .  9 203 . 9  
2. 9 4 . 7 
Loca ·1 UP i on 
-k , Cl 6 ,C3 l '1 Cl 7 i 
... .; . \ _ _ J:.__ 
. ,. '1 r 1 1 '"' f tl ____ 1_ ,_.L , � L ! c. ; •·; 8 . 6 j 10 
I --
Sou . c e : The /\me r -; r.: ;r n J\ � i 1  \? r: a c , 9 3rd • e d i ti on � 1 9  7 3 , p • 2 4 3 . 
* 1 968 d ata from 197 1 S ta t i s t i ca l  Abs tracts . 
I NDUSTR IAL OkGAN I ZAT IONS 
The structure of l abor uni ons re l ates tc the i ndustr i a l d e vel -
d-?. r- i  i; e d  a s tru cture :- a :1 o rgan i za  t i on a ·1 con fi g u ra t -l en  conci  i :  i oned  by the 
n«tu r-c-! of the b �r i ne ss f i 1 ms \ti ·�·,h � 1!hom they ,1ego t 'l ate . n l 2 Con sequentl y , 
the s tructure of bdustr i '"� S i r� d f rates  pote i  t 1 -� l  Lar 1Ja i r: h1 g  rel a t i o n shi ps 
wi th l a bor u ni on s .  Thu s , � d " scu s s i on con ceri� i n g  i �du s t ry aspects 
prov i de s  a 11 � n a l ysi s  of  factors a ffect i n g b� s i n� ss deci s i on s . 
cG "i :ici de  �; o c l os E: l y  w 'i t h  t he gr-o�vth sectors of t he l a bor force s u gge :· ts 
that 1J n i un s  nv9y be a da p t i n g  s ome•,1v:1 at  more effec t ·i ve l y  to a chang i n g  
. h . � �  . " , 3  env 1 rnr.rr:ent t ar. E: �c- n era. 1 1 y rec0 �n ned . �· Th is  growth suggests th�t  
, ?j :::.,: Robert /\ve , ·· i tt, The Dua l ECQtK:3Y.. ( 1 h:·d Yo rk � 1 968 ) , p .  1 3 1 . 
1 3/Ma , te r ,  Estey , o p. cit. ) p .  1 : . 
un; on and i ndustrial o rganizati on s  oµerate wit h a degree of separa t i on . 
The vari ous powers that each control s affects factors su ch as wage s .  
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One can have  a type of market known as a b i l atP.ra l  monopol y .  Rou ghl y  
s pea� i ng ,  th i · type of mono l oly a pp 1 1 e s whenever a u n i on can ra i se the 
wage l e�e l  o f  a f i rm o r  i n du stry within a certa i n range  wi th�ut causi n g 
any d v erst effects on the demand for l abor and whenever emp l oyers can 
reduce the  wage  l evel w i thout a ny adverse effects on t he  suppl y of 
labor . 1 4  In a bil atera l  monopo l y  situat i on t he  wage a nd  amount of l a b r 
h i red wou l d be between the two extremes . A condit i on can exi st where 
countervai li ng powe r operates . Labor un i on power, due to the number of  
worke rs under col l ecti ve agreements � i :  b l unted by management pow_r, due 
to i nriu� tr i a I c c, ncen t ra t i ons . l he se  rP 1 at i o;1sh 1 p� a r0 im�ortrmt i n  
d e  term i n i n g \Jag  e i 1 , c ;--eas es . Thu s , the d i s cu s s i o  11 w ; n a r a 1 y z e con c en­
t rated industrial aspects and consequent l y  its i mpac t  on wa ges. 
Industri al st.r u ctu r·e of firms i s  .xamined ·i n l\•;c rJarts : ( 1 )  
industrial env i ronment and (2 ) concentrat d i ndu strie3 . 
Indus �rial Envi ronMent 
Industri al env i ro nment of fi rms h as be n d i s cu ssed in some 
detail b y  vari ous authors. Most i ndustri es are descri bed in terms of 
being h i gh l y concentrated wi th a s i g nificant magn i tude of market dom ina­
ti on by a few l arge f i rms . For instance ,  " l ess than one percent of 
14 / P i chard Rowan , ed . , 1 1 An Eval uat i on of Wage Theory , "  Rea d i n q s  
i n  L abor Economics and La bor Re l a tion s ( I l l i nois , 1972 ) ,  p .  438-. --·-
36 
the manufactur i ng  compani es do over half of all the manufactur i ng 
bus iness . 11 1 5  One sees dominant firms w ith vast markets controlling 
l arge f i nancial assets. Needless to say, such comments are general i za­
tions and no appl i cation to any particular fi rm i� being made. For a 
more exacting account of industr i al organization, one needs to read  
descript i ons developed by Richard Caves and Joe Bai n. Such a discus sion 
of industri al organ i zation is beyond the scope of thi s  paper. However ,  
s peci fic i tems o f  relationships between unions and firms will be ex­
amined. 
The demand for labor is determi ned by various factors . One 
dominant fa ctor i s  demand of the product p roduced by labor . Conse­
quent l y �  an  e l a s t i c i ty of demand for l a bor also has  been devel oped. 
Elasticity of demand for labor1 6  
1 .  Elasticity of  dema nd for the product . 
2 .  Proporti on which labor costs form of total production costs . 
3 .  The difficulty of substituting other factors for l a bor in 
production. 
4 .  The supply curves of product ive services other than labor . 
To sum up : an industry ' s  demand for labor will be more i n­
elastic - that is, a wage increase wi l l  produce a sma l l er drop 
in employment - i n  proportion as : ( 1 )  demand for the product is 
inelastic ; ( 2 )  l abor costs form a sma l l proportion of tota l costs ; 





i�;�a���� : i 7
a n d  ( 4 ) supply of one or  more non -
JS/ Rob inson, Morton , and Calderwood, An Introduction to Economic 
Rea soning ( New York � 1967 ),  p. 65 . 
16/ L l oyd Reynol ds, L a bor Economics and L a bor Re l at i ons (New 
Jersey , 1 9 70 ) ,  p .  82 . 
1Z/ 1 b i d . ,  p .  8 3 . 
The l abor force was growi ng  at an ann ual rate of over two 
mill ion annua) ly but the natural growth rate now is appro�imatel y  1½ 
mill i on a year . 18  The growth rate is less than recent trends. Women 
wil l o�cupy more jobs, so many shortages in ind u stries wil i not appear. 
Labor supp l y would indicate a large age group ( 24 -35 ) necessary for 
rap i d  economic expansi on . This age group provides industry with the 
necessary ma npower for middle management and labor positions. 
Labor ' s suppl y and demand ha s  been discussed to some extent. 
37  
Next a stu dy of specific resul ts o f  firm concentrations and mergers wil l 
be presented. 
Firms h ave acqu·i red large financ ial assets. Wealth of firms has 
bean perpe tua ted and  increased thrcu gh acquisit i on of d iff2rent ind�s 
trial fir.ms. Diversification of mul ti-industry companies is qui te 
common. Such practices have resu l ted in enormous financial a.ssets of 
bus i ness enterprises. Comparison of assets between firms and unions 
reveals a large edge held by firms. Nevertheless, comparison between 
firms and unions should be i n  representative industries. However, firms 
and also unions are multi-industry, making such analysis difficul t. 
Nevertheless, Table 8 does represent a degree of compar i sons between 
business en terprises and l abor unions. 
18/ Busines s vJee k ,  February 10 , 1 973, p. 1 5 .  
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Tabl e 8. Com�ar� son of As �ets of S i x . Largest  Business Enterpri ses with 
As ets of Six Largest Internati unal  Un i ons as Ranked by Assets 
( i n  Mil l i ons o f  Do l lars ) �  1963. 
Company 
Ameri can Telephone & 
Tel egraph 
Standard Oi l ( N. J. ) 
General Motors 
Ford 
U. S. Steel 
Gulf Oi l 
Net Ass ets 
26 , 716. 5 
11, 487. 7 
10, 239. 5 
5 , 416 . 5  
5 , 059. 7 
4, 243. 6 
Uni on Net Assets 
Automobi le Workers 
M i ne  vJorkers 
Teamsters 
Machi ni sts 
Lad i es ' Garment Workers 
Bri c klayers 
87. 9 
83. 5 
41 . 5 
29. 5 
29. 1 
28 . 4  
Source : Bloom and Northrup, Economi cs of Labor Relati ons , 1965, p. 129. 
F i rms have a l �o formed un i on s  amon g  themse l ves . The two nati on­
a l  a s soc i ati ons are the Nati onal As soc i ati on of Manufacturers and Un i ted 
States Chamber of Commerce .  In add i ti on, employer assoc i ati ons have 
been organi zed to negoti ate wi th uni ons. For example, mutual pac ts 
have been organi zed i n  suc h  areas as trucki ng and mar i ti me. These 
empl oyer assoc i ati ons are unable, however, to mai ntai n a uni ted front 
where a larg e number of small fi rms are pres ent; whereas , employer 
assoc i ati ons among a small number of l arge fi rms can be very effecti ve . 
A factor emerg i ng from multi -i ndustry fi rms and  uni ons i s  co­
ali ti on i n  bargai ni ng agreements . I n  attempti ng to bargai n with con­
glomerates , uni on c ontracts wi ll expi re in multi - i ndustri es at the same 
ti me. The s i tuati o n  i s  then present whereby uni o ns can s hut down a 
mul ti - i ndustri al corporati on. 
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Conce ntrated Indu stries 
Man y factors cou l d  be exami ned when dete rmining which data best 
describes  concentrated ind ustries. One can study assets  per emp l o yee, 
sales pe r employee ,  percent of val ue o f  shipments by la rge prod uc ers, 
profits pe r do l l a r of  sal es, rate of retu rn on  stockhold ers '  equity � o r  
p ofits befo re taxes. The two variables chosen are percent of value o f  
s hipments and profits befo re taxes . The industrial section is divided 
i nto two pa rts : (1 )  degree of monopo l y  power and ( 2) profit rates. 
Degree of Monopo ly Power 
A concentrated fi rm which has some degree of monopo i y power 
represents strong res i stance to union demands. In oligopolistic i n­
dustries , such  as automobiles and steel, wage increases he re can be 
blunted due to bargaining power of  concentrated firms. Some experts u se 
conc0 ntration ratios to indicate this d eg ree of monopoly power. Anothe r 
possib . l  · ty is that concentrated firms g rant wage increases  rather than 
risk prolonged strikss. This degree of monopoly power allows concen­
trated firms to pass increased costs to the consumer. More evidence 
needs to be develoo�d before any def i nite concl usions can be made .  
The following table denote s concentration ratios  as the per­
centage of  total output of a particu l ar product su pplied b y  those  whose 
principal activit y is the making of that product. Such data provides 
insight into the i ndustrial structure of these particular industries. 
Tabl e 9. Pe rcent of Shipments Accounted for by Large Manufacturing 
Compani es ,  S e l ec ted Indu str ies .  
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Numbe r of 
Compani es 
V al ue of S h i pments � percent of 
total ranked by company size 
Industry for Year of  1967 
Motor vehicles 
Motor vehicle pa rts & 
acces sories 
Ai re raft 
Petroleum refining 




Meat pac k i ng plant 
Cot s ·�tuc ·� i  0·1 ii:a c h i nery 
T i res and i nnertubes 
Cigarettes 
Malt liquors 
Te l ephone , telegraph  
apparatus 
Motors & generator 
Canned fru i ts & vegeta bles 
Soap & other detergents 
Fabricated structural steel 
Organic fibers ,  non-
ce  1 1  ul  os i c 
Blast furnaces  & steel mi lls 
107 
1 !' 424 













1 , 865 
22 
208 
4 8 20 
largest l argest l argest 
92  
60  
6 9  
33  
6 4  
69  
26 
4 1  
70 
8 1  
4 0  




1 3  
84 


































* (D ) 
84 
Source : 1·he American Al �anac , 93rd. edition ,  197 3 , p. 704. 
*D - wi thhel d to avoid disclosu re. 
!Ligh Degree of Monoooly Power 
A powe rful f i rm wh i ch has a degree of monopol y power represents 
s trong r e s i st, nce  to union wage demands. In oligopolistic ind ustries , 
s u ch as automobiles and stee l , wage i nc reases could be l ower because of 
4 1  
such firm structu ral features. Autho\ �s use concentration ratios here to 
indicate this monopol y  power . 
P rofit Rates 
Profit ru tes hel p explain  product environmen t of different 
industries. High profi t i n dustries denote a greater control over the 
marke t .  Profit rates su9gest the degree of price setting abil ity of 
firms . Neverthel ess, one shoul d be careful of suggesting too much from 
such data. Firms � instead of acquiring l arge profits , may seek to gain 
weal t h  through diversificati on in other industries. A l arge profit can 
be nu l l ified through acquisition of non-profitabl e firms . 
The d�ta  concerni n g  percent of val ue of s hipment� by l n rge 
producers and corporate profits before taxes were chosen because several 
correl ation studies have been done using such variabl es . In fol l owing 
chapters , importance of such data as degree of mono pol y power and profit 
rates wil l become apparent. 
Table 10 . Corporate Profits, by I ndustry ( in Billions of Dollars) . 
Before Taxes After Taxes 
Industry 1968 1969 1970 1968 1969 1970 
Agriculture, forestr y, and 
fis heries . 2  . 2  . 1 . 1  . 1  . 1  
mining . 8  . 7  . 6  . 6  . 5  . 3  
contract construction 1 .  9 1 .  9 1 . 6 1 . 2 1 . 1  1 . 0  
manufacturing 43. 4 39 . 3  32 . 1  22 . 8  19 . 7  16 . 9  
Wholes ale & retail trade 11 . 6  12. 1 11 . 5  6 . 8  7 . 0 7 . 0  
Finance, insurance, and 
real estate 13 . 0  13. 5 14 . 4  6 . 2  6 . 2  6 . 3  
transportation . 9 . 6  - . 3  . 3  - . 8 
Communication & publ ic util . 9 . 7 9 . 7 8 . 8  4 . 8  4 . 8  4 . 8  
s ervices 2 . 0 1 . 7 1 . 7 1 . 0  . 7  . 8  
Source : The Ameri can Almanac, 93rd . edi tion, 1 973, p .  482 . 
LEGAL ENV I RONMENT 
Legal aspects concerning unions ' s tructure are numerous. The 
discussion will include topics dealing with five areas : ( 1) torts, 
( 2) contracts , (3) restraints of trade, ( 4) Supreme Court cases, and 
( 5) other legal accords .  
Torts 
A tort is an i njury to the person, property, or right of an ­
other not arising out of a contract . This is different from a breach of 
contract where breaking the terms of a contract b y  non-performance or 
by some overt act contrary to the agreement occurs . A tort can best be 
described as a violation of legal duty to another . 
Union members, during strikes, carry on many activities such a s  
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pi cketing and work stoppages . Thes e  actions are within the l aw. 
D i fficu l ties , however, uccu r  when il l egal . conduct creates damages to 
property of bu sines s f i rms. For instance , torts in  the form of property 
destruction a re commi tted by window and equipment - smashin g .  The em­
pl oyer wil l have diffi cul ties in recovering damages from a u ni on .  One 
expert has concl uded that 1 1 the union is not l iabl e for acts of i ts 
members in the course of a l abor dispute. 1 1 1 9 The doctrine o f  respondent 
superi or ( principal is l iabl e to third person for wron gful acts of his 
agent ) does not see� to a pply  for l abor unions . Therefore, l abor union 
members can commi t torts wi th no effective way of stoppi ng them or 
recovering damages from them. 
The v i ol en ce i n  l abor negot i ati ons  shou l d not obs cure the fact 
that most contracts are peacefu l l y  n egotiated . Neverthel ess, unions ar·e 
respons i bl e  to some degree for actions of th eir members. A ca se  now 
before the Nat i onal L a bor Rel ati on s  Board between Associated B uil ders 
and Contractors ( ABC) and the major craft unions coul d resol ve l egal 
responsibil i ty of uni ons . 
Contl acts 
National unions bargain with  companies about terms o f  l abor 
contracts. A n ational contrict once  reached i s  then voted u pon  by eac h  
l ocal . Howeve r, l ocal unions  can strike be cau se of conditi ons o f  empl oy­
ment i n  v a r i o u s  f i rms . So, the signing of a nationa l contract does 
1 9/ Ros c oe  Poun d ,  La bor Union s and the Con cept of P ub l i c  S ervic e 
(Washington, D . C . , 195 9 ) , p . 28 . 
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not necess ari l y  p revent loca l s  from stri k i ng. 
Contracts reached by union offici a l s  al so have to be acce ptabl e 
to the membership of that u nion. Several cases  have occurred in which 
un i on offi� i als n eede to re turn to the bargain i n� table to gain larger 
wage increases. U� i ons have a d i fficul t task in negotiati ng contracts 
acceptable to managerrent and numerous uni on members. The amount of 
fl ex i b i lity i n  contracts has thus drawn both prai se a�d criticism . 
The Norr i s -L a  uard i a Act has i nsulated labor uni ons in the 
f iel d of  inju nct · o s aga i nst lia bi li ty for breach of contract . 
In  p ract i ca 1
2
e ff ct the unions h ad a general immun i ty for breach 
of contra.ct. U . 
Supreme Court Cases 
U. S. Supr  me Court  d ee i siuns have g i ven  un i on s  the pmver to 
res tra i n trade w i thout  provi�i ng restricti ons. The fol l owi n g  four 
court rul i n gs wi 1 1  gi e some_ idea of  the power that labor ha s received : 
Apex  Hos i e ry Co . vs .  Leader - i t  was held that l abor unions 
were vt i th i n  the p · rv i e\\l of the Sherman Act . Hm,e ve r , a d i rect 
and intentiona l  p eventi on of sh i pment of  del i very of goods i n  
i nterstate comme �ce was hel d not i n  restra i n t o f  commerce. 2 1 
U . S. vs .  Hutcheson - s econdary boycotts were held immuned 
from l i a b i lity · n�er the Sherwan Act so long as the union acted
2 2  i n  i ts se l f i nteres � and d i d  not comb i ne wi th non-labor groups .  
Hunt  vs. Cru��ech - this Court decis i on went the whole way of  
complete i mmun i �· .  I t  i s  not  merely , therefore, that l abo r u n i on s  
a re exempted  fro  the  provisions of the statutes a ga i nst c omb i n a­
t i ons and agreements i n  res t  a i nt of trad e . They may acti vel y 
interfere w i th t rade and comn.erce vJi th i mmun i ty from wh at  is often 
the onl y e ffect i ve remedy . 2 3 
20/ Ro s coe Po . d ,  Leoal Im . m i t i es of Labor Un i on s  ( v!ash i r. gton , 
D. C . , 1 9 5 7 ) , p .  26 .  
2 1 / 1 ,  . d  - 0 1  • , p . 34. 22 / I bi d . , p. 34 . 2 31 I b i d ., p. 34 - 35 .  
Al l en Brad l ey vs. Local Un i on No . 3 - the Court is hel pl ess 
to prevent the exerc i s es of moncpol y power by l abor uni on s. The 
desirabil ity of such an exempt-i on �4 
labor unions is a question 
for the d etermination of congress .  
The C l ayton Act ( 1914) made  u nions exempt from anti-monopol y 
l egis l ati on . L abor e l ation over th i s  act, however, prcved  short-l ived . 
T he  j udicial interpretation wa s that Section 6 of the Cl � yton Act had 
not  ch anged the  fundamental fact that it was activiti e s  of a union that 
determi ned whethe r  or not it was i n  viol ation of the arititrust law. 2 5  
However, prev i ous l y  ci ted interpretations of Supreme Court cases seemed 
to exempt u nions from a ny antitrust action . 
A Supreme Court decision of the United Mine Workers vs . James 
M .  Penn "ington_ brought anti trust action 'i nto co 1 1  ecti ve bargaining 
again . " The  Court hel d that a wage agreement between a uni on and an 
emp l oyer  or group of empl oyers whi ch incl udes an understand i ng that the 
union wi l l  see k the s ame terms from other empl oyers in the i ndustry, 
may viol ate ant i tru st l aws . 1 1 26 
Impl ications of the United Mine lt.'orkers vs . James 1 .  Penn i ngton 
Ca se are numerous .  Pattern bargaining may v iol ate the antitrust l aw. 
Al so , mu l t i-emp l oyer agreements , which impl y  the same terms imposed on 
employe rs who were not members of the grou p, may vi ol ate antitrust. 
Cl arifi cat f on is needed to determine the degree of antitrust act ion.  
24l oona l d  Ric hbe rg, Labor Union  Monopoly ( Chicago, 1965) , 
pp . 83-84 . 
p .  13 1 .  
2 5/Marten E stey, o p . cit . , p . 97 . 
2 6/Herbert  Ma rx, ed . ,  American Labor Toda y ( New York, 1 965 ) , 
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Restraints of Trade 
Antitrust action is an al l -inclusive term. Usually such term · ­
nology is applied to business firms . Actions include brea k-up of firms 
fines a nd restrictions on exclusive business pra_ctices . Anti trust is 
applied to el i minate monopol y and res traint of  trade practices . If 
antitrust is applied to labor unions such policy would fol lov✓ the 
fol lowing specifi c  guidelines: 27 
1. Ban industry-wide power of unions over bargainin g. 
2. Prohibit restraints of trade by labor unions. 
3. Ban al l uni on secondary boycotts. 
4. Outlaw the union shop. 
The  first proposal wou l d el imi nate nationa l  unions � contro l  over 
bargaining agreements. Local unions would then bargain with firms. Such 
bargaining with local unions would mean multiple contracts for firms. 
The smaller l ocal unions woul d also find difficu l ty in bargaining with 
powerful industrial corporations. One would suspect that l a bor peace 
among managements and unions woul d d i sappear. There wou l d be poc ke ts of 
isol ated strikes in i ndustries. Local union members might turn to 
violence to resolve their frustrations in bargain i ng. 
The second guideline, which would prohibit restraints of trade 
by labor unions, is vague in specifics of appl ication. S uch a proposal 
does not call for a shattering effect of union organi zations. The same 
bargaining arrangements woul d be kept but violators such as employers 
27/Apply the Antitrust L a\•/ to Un i on s { v!ashington, D. C . : Chamber 
of Commerce of  the U . S . ,  1963 ) .  
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and un i on s  could recei ve fines. For i nstance, multi -un i t contracts  that 
imply the same terms on employers who are n ot members of the grou p may 
violate the restrai nt  of trade l aw. 
Secondary boycotts are i l legal. A boycott whi ch restrains 
workers from deali ng  with an ybody who used the goods of an ' ' offendi ng" 
employer is declared i llegal by the Taft-Hartley Act . The boycott is 
legal , hov.1ever, if the restraint of trade was an " i n ci dental " conse­
quence of the un i on ' s  pursuit of i ts primary obj ect i ve of wi nn i ng a 
labor di spute. 28 
Outl awi ng of the un i on shop coul d vi rtuall y destroy unions. 
There i s. a n eed for unions to acqui re membershi p automat i cally . Con ­
centrated u nion s a re n eces sary to bargai n vJi th l arge i nd u stri a l  f i rms . 
Unions without such an organ i zation mi ght be unabl e to secure gai n s  that 
workers deserve.  
Other Legal Accords 
Labor un i ons are tax-exempt associ ati ons. The revenues recei ved 
by un i ons  are n ot depleted because of taxes . Labor orga n i zat i on s  are 
als o  n ot req u i red to  i ncorporate. Thi s l ack of corporate status poses 
man y i nterest i ng questi on s .  The reason i s  that most labor organ i zat i ons 
are controll ed through corporation la ,. Only ei ght states have general 
statute s as to sui ts by and agai n st u n i n corporated associ at i on s. 
State  right-to-work l aws are for the purpose of giv i ng employees 
a cho i ce to un i on i ze or not.  Today, nin eteen states have  state ri ght -
28/Marten E stey, op . ci t . , p. 98. 
to- ork l aws. The se  states are mi dwest and southern in geographic 
l ocation , an d re l y  heavily on agricu l ture as their industrial base. 
By the 1960 1 s no maj or industria l states had a right-to-work l aw. 
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CHAPTER I I I  
CONDUCT 
Cond uct o f  u n i ons  � s  s tu d i ed i n  a manner s i m i lar to t
hat of  
struct ure . Spe c i f i cal l y ,  the e xami nat ion of  conduct  
factors wi ll i n ­
cl ude  ( 1 )  s t r i k e s  and ( 2 ) u n ion f i nances . These fac
tors explai n much of 
l abor u 1 i on c�:1duc  t wh i ch ·j n fl uences  o ur  economy . 
STR I KES 
Labor  u n i on conduct i n vo l ves many ac t i v i t i e s  i n  o
rder to ach i eve 
col l e ct i ve barga i n i n g  agreemen ts . The s tri ke i s
 a d omi nctn t feature 
iJ8c;i 1 1 s P  0 -f  i ts pr.l')romi c r.osts a nd the pub l i c i ty wh i
ch i t  rec e i ve s . 
Therefore , any d i s c u s s i on concern i ng u n i on conduc
t  wi l l  have to i n c l ude 
str i ke s as a general top i c  area . 
A s tr i ke h as many feat u res .  The maj or area s  th
at wil l be 
stud i ed are : ( 1 )  types , ( 2 ) j ob  r ' ghts , ( 3 )  sto
p pages , and ( 4 ) costs of 
strike s . 
J)'pes of  Str i k e s  
Un ion s ' 1 1 bi g "  weapon i s  known a s  t h e  s tr i ke . A 
stri ke i s  a work  
s toppage ; e s pec i al l y  the q u i � t i ng of  wor k by a 
body of  l aborers for the 
purpose o f  �ompel l ing the emp loyers to compl y wi t
h s ome demand  or con ­
d i t ion .  Un ion off i c i als u s e  th i s  weapon � or thr
eat of , i n  negot i at i ng 
for a greeme nts . S tr i kes a re th e  met hod prov i ded fo
r u n i ons  to deal wi th 
l a rge f i r ns i n  wage determi nat i on s .  Th i s i �  why
 t he u n i on ' s r i ght to 
str i ke i s  c1 p re rcqu ·i s ·i te to u n i on pcn 12 r . 
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There are many d i fferent strike cl assificat i on schemes . Strikes 
are termed as : ( 1) wil dcat , ( 2) quickie , ( 3) partial, and (4) neg6-
tiations failure . Each of these different types of walk-outs have 
significance to unions and management. For instance, in 1972 , small 
strikes were taking a heavy tol l on firms when a few workers in key jobs 
walked off the job . Such strikes cause smal l union losses while in­
fl icting heavy dama ges to f irms . Such pol icy represents a particular 
phil osophy of l 3bor uni ons to various market si tuati ons .  Our purpcse is 
to examine different types of strikes to cl arify objectives. 
Wil dcat strikes occur when a group of employees wal k off the job 
for some particular reason. Such a walk-out is not cal led by union 
offici a l s. In  t his situation , members woul d not rece i ve a ny � 'l pport 
from unton official s. The wildcat strikes represent an earl y period i n 
national unions' control over union members. Consequentl y ,  such  s trikes 
are of short duration now . Management and national unions move quickl y 
to resol ve minor differences . 
A quickie strike is a recent procedure used by unions. Such a 
situation occurs when workers walk off the job for a short per i od of 
time. Usual l y  the next day the workers are back at work . This stri ke 
i s  cal l ed by union official s  for the purpose of disrupting working 
procedures whil e causi ng a min i mum of l oss to union f i nances . A uni on 
may use such tactics when finances are l ow because strike benef its are 
not paid un l ess a str i ke is continued for a bout two weeks. 
Government emp l oyees and other rel ated pub lic servi ce organi­
zations appl y the partial strike procedure . V i tal operations ,  such as 
5 1  
pol i c e and f ire protect i on, are cont i n ued , but at a reduced rate . An 
excess ive n umber o f  worke rs on si ck  cal l i s  a pretense used by l abor to 
d isregard no-str i ke agreements .  Several au thors have sug gested that the 
pub lic serv ice area may cause more se ri o us str ike prob l ems i n  fu ture 
years . Str i kes may occu r  espec i a l l y at the state l e ve l  where workers 
have no  a l ternat i ves for a l l ev i atin g  contrac t differ�nces .  
The catchal l category of str i kes i s  the negoti ation ' s  fail ure .  
T h is str ike happens for many reasons .  Vast differences i n  s ettlement 
offers are a common d iffi c u l ty .  However ,  if the stren ath of the u n ion 
is a t  stake, the  so-cal l ed g roup obj ective of the worke rs may take 
precedence ove r the i mmed i ate economi c o bj e ct i ves. 1 The len gth of time 
i nvol ved in a str i ke of th is type may pos s i b i y  be irre l evdn L .  U rd on s 
are en gaged in a power s trugg l e .  Unions form a cohesive group in order  
to ach ieve the i r g oa l s .  These types of stri kes are not  on l y  costl y but  
s erve as an  effect i ve too1 \'1hereby workers have a chan ce to "speak u p " . 
Th i s s tr ike was aga inst Phe l p Dod ge at Bisbee ,  Dou g l as , and 
Morenc i , Ar i zona . Settl ement o f  the str i ke brou ght an  average 
increase i wa g es of fi fteen cents an hou r , but since the empl oyees  
we re o ffe red a n  avera ge i n crease of 12½ an  hou r be fore the str i ke ,  
the a ctual stri ke gai n was 2½ an hour . It appears that the empl oyee s 
mu st  work  2 , 6 20 days to ma ke u p  the ir l ost wages o ut of the ir actual 
ga i n .  I f we f i g ure six worki ng  days a week , they must work more 
than e i ght years . 2 
There are many reasons for strikes . Ment i on was made of a 
pov,er stru g 9 l e ;  however ,  suc h  motives a re d i ff i c u l t to cl ass i fy .  A 
l/Ro b i nson , Morton , and Ca l derwood , An I n troduc t ion to Economi c 
Reason i nq ( NevJ York , 1967 ) ,  p . .  88 . 
2/oona l d R ic h berg , Labor Un i on Monopo ly (Ch i c a go ,  1 9 6 5 ) ,  p . 109 . 
wage d i spu te can be disgu i sed as a power struggl e .  For the mos t part , 
wage changes have accounted for a ma jority of  strikes , bu t wages are 
by no means the onl y reason . In  recent years , for exampl e ,  there have 
been s trikes over the fol lowing kinds of iss ues: pl ant work  rul es ,  
d u ration of contract , funding of pension plans , arbitration proposals , 
and union security agreements . ( See Table 1 1. ) 
Table 1 1 . Quantitative Breakdown of Cau ses of Strikes for 1 97 0 .  
Major I ssues  
% of 
Stoppages 
General wag� changes  
Plant adm i n i strat i on 
Union or.ganizations & security 
Interunion & intraunion matters 
Not reported 
Hours of work 
49 . 9  
16 . 1  
1 0 . 3  
9 . 9  
1.0 
0. 1 
Major Is s ues 
% of 
Stoppages 
Wags adj u s tments 
Other working conditions 
Job security 
Other contract ual matters 
Supplementary benefits 
3 . 3  
3 . 1 
3. 0 
1 . 9  
1 . 0 
Source:  Dan Gol enpaul , ed . ,  Information Almanac , twenty-sixth edition � 
New York : 197 1 , p .  1 2 3 . 
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Workers on s trike perceive that their job has not been termi ­
nated but suspended pending compl etion of satisfactory agreements .  The 
worker has a vested interest in his job . Management may , however , 
resort to hiring other personnel for those striking workers , i n  order 
for the business to continue operati ons properly . When such confl icting 
interests are p re sent , the courts become the final arbitrators . 
Fede�al labor laws generally perm i t an empl oyer to replace 
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strik i ng workers who struck in protest  of  unfair labor p ractices.  Cases  
have occurred in which white coll ar worker s  have been s u spended tempor­
a rily, not dism i s sed , because o f  a production strike . However , a lock­
out, which means that an employer  involved in a labor dispute has shut 
down his plant woul d be an unfair labor practice .  
The difficu l ty in determining  jobs ' rights stems from a d i s -
tinction in  motive s .  Workers striking for economic rea sons and unfa i r  
labor practices have different rights .  Management i s  abl e to hire other 
workers  du ring an economic strike . Usua l l y such practices  of strike 
break i ng a re met with vio l ence whi c h has prompted the Supreme Court to 
move toward clarificat ion of job  rights . Workers on s trike cannot be 
f i r ·eu fo r s t 1 ·i k i r i g  fo , ·  a 1 1  un fa i r 1 abor pt actice . Al so , std ��e s  i nvo� v· ­
ing economic reasons retain a pa rtial i mmunity from jo b  repl acement : 
A unanimou s  Supreme Court decision ruled Tuesday that it is 
an unfair labor practice fo� an employe r  to fire a worker solely 
for taking part in a strike . . . .  In  overturning th e  Lower Court , 
the Supreme Court said , in an opinion written by J u s tice Potte r 
Stewart , that firing a man on strike is  cause enough for his 
reinstatement . 
Stoppages 
Working time lo st in strikes has been decreasing in the  United 
State s .  Management and labor u nions have been working more effectively 
in avo i ding str i kes . Alternatives to s t rikes have been achieved and are 
the goal o f  both parties . Whil e working time lo st during str i kes has 
been declining as shown in Table 1 2 , time lo st is  still a significant 
Y II High  Court  Ru l e s  Man Cannot be Fi red for Striking , 11 M i  nnea po 1 is 
Tribune , November 8 ,  1 9 72 , p .  5A . 
factor as wi l l  be d i s cussed i n  later sections of thi s  chapter. Due to 
the decl i ne in l oss of work i ng t i me , more time i s  now l ost because · of  
coffee b reaks or s i ckness than because of st r i kes . Some e xperts a re 
Table 1 2 .  Working T i me Lost i n  Strikes as a Percent of Work i ng Time 
in Total Economy. 
Year 




0 . 47%  
0. 26% 
0. 17% 
Source: Richard Rowan , ed . ,  "Freedom to Strike i s  in  the Publ ic 
J ntcre st, ' 1 Read i �gs i n  Labor Econ�mic s end L�bor  Relati on s , 
19 7 2 , p . 327 .  
of the op i nion that the relat i ve t ime loss due to strikes performed a 
valua ble function i n  our free collecti ve bargai ning system. The time 
loss due to str i kes represents a des i re by workers to secure wage 
i ncreases that are due to them. 
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Whil e the percentage of t ime lost i n  strikes has been decreas i n g, 
there has been a large i ncrease in the total number of stoppages , 
workers , and man days i dle due to strikes. One can see s u ffic i ent 
disturbance i n  econom i c or poli t i cal life to gen erate pres s u re for 
changes in the i nd ustria l relat i ons system . (See Table 13. ) 




N umbe r o f  Stop�a ges 
3 , 65 5  
5, 700 
\Jorkers Invol ved 
1 , 640 , 000 
2, 481, 000 
Man Days I d l e 
22_, 900 , 000 
4 2 , 86 9 , 000 
Source: Luman Long , ed . ,  T he Worl d Al manac ( New York : Norton & 
Company, Inc . ,  1 968) , p .  3 62 . 
5 5  
The  Un i ted ·States has  a rel ativel y strike-prone economy in 
comparis on to o ther industrial nations . Even when comparisons are 
adju s ted for rel ative size differences, the United State � has an exces s 
of time l os t  d ur i ng s trikes . Nations, s uch as Japan and West Germany , 
do not experi ence t his l o s s . The Un ited States ranks near the top among 
nation s · n  the amount of working time l os t  in ind u s tr i al dispu tes . 
Fu rthermore, threats o f  a po s sib l e  trike can c reate havoc . 
There was a b i z arre aftermath to the - peacefu l  negotiation of  the 197 1 
labor-management a greement in the steel indu stry : Many m i ll s s h ut  down 
or c u t  bac k ope rati ons  to as  l ow as 2 5% of capacity ; mure than 80 , 000 
s teel workers were l aid off - s ome for eight  mont h s , and most mil ls 
pos ted heavy o perat i r. g los ses .
4 When a settl ement was reached peace­
ful l y ,  acc umul ated i nventori es in preparation fo r  a strike had to be 
\1orked o ff . 
Exami na tion of work stoppages reveal s informat i on about unions 
4/ - Bus i nes s  i•:eek , 1arch 1 0 , 197 3 ,  p .  1 26 . 
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and f i rms . Most maj or strikes occur in the manufacturing sector. Thi s 
is to be expected because of the greater number of firms in manufactur­
i ng .  Neverthel es s , one can f i nd apparent reasons for so many str i kes . 
Concentrated unions and f i rms l ead to bargai n i ng confl i cts . 
Tabl e 14 .  Work Stoppages , by Indu stri al Group for 197 1 .  
Workers i nvol ved Man- Days I d l e 
Industry Group Work Stoppages in thousands i n  thousand s 
Manufactur i ng 2 , 389 848 18, 319  
Nonmanufacturi ng 
-mi n i ng 657 383 4 , 934 
- contract cons true-
t i on 7 5 1  450 6 !' 851  
-tra n s po rtat i on , 
c ommuni cati on ,  etc . 3 1 6 267 1 3, 420 
-Government 327 1 5 1  893 
Source :  The Amer i can Al manac , 93rd . ed i t i on ,  1 97 3 .  p .  704 .  
Manufactur i ng ,  as an i ndustri al group ,  can be further di v i ded 
i nto durabl e  and nondurabl e  goods sectors .  In d urabl e goods markets , 
work stoppages occur  more often . As soc i ated wi th durabl e goods fi rms 
are concentrated uni ons and f irms . Uni ons account for a l arge pro­
porti on of the vwrkers cover_ed by co l l ecti ve  agreements .  A l so � f i rms 
account for a substanti al percentage of shipments for thei r parti cul ar 
i ndustry . Th i s i nformat i on prov ides some rati onal e for the numerous 
str i kes i n  d urab l e goods . On the other hand , nondurab l e  goods ' markets 
are noted fo r havi ng fewe r concentrated uni o� s  and f irms . 
T he da ta c oncern i ng concentrated uni ons and f i rms wi l l  not 
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be p resented . C l assi f i cati on s chemes of the th ree var i a bl es are not 
compati bl e .  Part i a l  data , however , has l ed to th i s  rati onal e ,  probabl y  
correct , b ut  s t i ll untested . 
A look at  the a uto i ndus �ry reveal s a strike prone i ndus try . I t  
i s  an  i ndustry i n  wh i ch the fou r l argest compani es account for over 
ni nety percent o f  the shi pments , and un i on s  have over seventy percent of 
the workers under contract coverage. ( See Table 15 . ) 
Tab l e  1 5 .  Maj or  Str i kes i n  the Au to Indu stry. 
Workers 
Year Invol ved  Company Days Struck 
194'.3 200 , 000 General Motors 1 1 3  
1948 7 5 , 000 Chrys l e r 17 
1 949 62 , 000  Fo  d 25  
1 950 95 , 000 Chr s l er 102 
1955 160 , 000 Gene a l  Motors 12  
78 , 000 Ford 9 
1958 2 7 5 , 000 Ger era l Motors 26 
7 5 ,000 Ford 1 3  
1 96 1  2 39 , 0 00 General Motors 20 
1 1 6 , 000 Ford 19 
1 9 64 2 7 5 , 000 General Motors  45  
2 5 , 000 Ame i can Motors 7 
1 1 , 000 For ] 9  
1965  1 1 , 000 Ameri can Motors 20 
1 967 1 5 9 , 000  Ford 65 
44 , 00C  General Motors 1 3  
17 , 000 Chrysler 1 0  
1 968 18 , 000 General Motors 1 3  
1 969 28 , 000 General  Motors 87 
1970 3 5 5 , 000 Ge era l Motor s 69  
Sou rce : U . S . Ne�,s & Worl d Repor . , J u l y  30 , 19 7 3 , p. 4 5 . 
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The year 1973 ,-,a s , in general ,  a peaceful year in contract 
negoti ations . The Un i ted Auto Workers s igned major agreements among the 
auto i ndus tr i es wi thout  stri ke s . Two d omi nant factors that hel p exp l a i n  
thi s i nd ustr i al peace are: ( 1 ) wage-pri ce control s  and (2 ) the energy 
cri s i s . Uni ons have been negoti ating for fr i nge · benef i ts and short term 
contracts i n  anti c i pati on of exp i rati on of wage-pri ce control i n  March 
1 974 . The energy cr i s i s  has al s o  pl aced fi rms i n  h i gher pri or ity i n  
order to meet current demands .  
Co s ts 
Str i kes i nvo l ve costs i ncurred by _many peopl e dur ing such a 
wal kout . The l os s es  wi l l  be stud i ed by l oo k i ng at d irect, i nd irect, and 
\-Jc l fare ca sts. 
D i rect and Ind i rect Str i ke Costs 
Workers and empl oyers i nvol ved i n  a str i ke have d i rect l os ses 
from wages o r  prof its . However, the effect of  a wor k  stoppage s preads 
through i ndu stri es and p roduces l os ses at ti mes far d i stant from the 
s ource of the str i ke .  The Bureau of Labor Stati sti cs  has comp l eted 
stud i e s on  i nd i rect unemp l oyment cau sed by parti cu l ar stri ke s . For 
examp l e ,  Barr ington As s oci ates ;  report on the Effect of  the 1966 
New York C i ty tran s i t str i ke _ on the travel behavi or  of regu l a r trans i t  
users p rovi des good data on total stri ke c osts . Neverthel es s , one i s  
faced with ma ny uncertai n as pects . Str i kes i n  i ndu stri es , l i ke steel , 
mi ght i nd i rectl y cau se l ay offs i n  equ i pment man u facturers whi ch cou l d 
scarcel y  be rel a ted to the steel str i ke .  
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P u blic trans portation, wh i ch is  an  i mportant segment o f  our 
economy, 1 end s i tse 1 f to exp 1 ore the poss i bi l it i es of indirect unemp 1 oy­
ment . The publ i c  directly depends on commuter transportation for 
reachi ng wor k .  T h i s  study was  done in 1966  analyzi ng the effect of a 
New Yo rk C i ty transit s tr i ke on the trave l behavi or of regul ar trans i t  
u sers . Data i ndicates that man-days-idle due to stri kes  are much h i gher 
than those c ompu ted . Furthermore, i ndirect u nemployment can cause more 
interruptions or bottl enecks in the flow o f  goods and service s  than are 
accounted for in stri ke costs . 
That s tr i ke (New York trans it  strike) lasted al most  th i rteen 
days , the total man-days l os t  amounted to abo ut 440 , 000 . . . .  I n  
crude rou nd n umber� , the  l ost work t i me i n  New York C i ty wa s about 
ten ti mes the l os s  o f  the s tr i kers . Nor is thi s  a l l ,  l arge n umbers 
of s u burban workers  we re u n a b l e to get to wo rk . Ha ci th ey bP.en 
counted , the total l oss woul d h ave been boos ted to well over 5 
mil li on man - days . 
The Department of Labor computes the number of stoppages , 
workers i nvol ved,  and ma n -days -idle for str i kes of di fferent i nd u s tri e s . 
An i ndex i s  needed to c a l culate  esti mated costs . Stud i e s  have been 
done on some maj or  i ndus tr i es . For exampl e ,  auto workers wa ge loss  
was $2 30 m i l l i on in 1 964, S220 mi l l ion in  1 967  and $ 560  m i lli on i n  
197 0 . 6 A " comprehens i ve 1 1  l i s t i n g of strike cost could provi de va l uabl e 
informati on concern i ng mon i tori ng of the economy . Cr i ti ca l  l os se s  
of good s  a nd services would be accounted for . ( See Ta b l e 1 6 . ) 
� Ewa n Clague , The Bureau of La bor Stati s t i c s  (New York , 1 968 ) , 
pp . 1 39 - 140 . 
§_/ U • S . N ews & ifo r l d Report , J u  1 y 3 0 , 19 7 3 , p . 4 5 . 
I 
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Tabl e 1 6 . General Motors Stri ke in  1972 . 
The e st i mates of economi c l o s s e s  
· 20 mi l l i on d o l l ars i n  wages 
· 8 rn i l  1 i on do 1 1 a rs  i n GM pro 'f i ts 
· 39 , 000 au tomob i l e s not bui l t  
· 5  m i l l i on d o l l ars i n  str i ke 
benefi ts  pai d by the UAW str i ke 
fund 
• mill i ons i n  taxes, i nclud i ng 
$300, 000 for the ci ty of Norwood 
alone 
• mi l l i ons i n  l os s e s  to suppl i e rs , 
one merchant wh o l a unders s hop 
un i forms for the pl ant , for 
exampl e, esti mated h i s l o s s  at 
$50, 000. 
Source : U . S .  News & Worl d Report, October 9, 1972, p.  1 04 .  
We l fare Costs 
Workers' r i g hts  for publ i c  as s i s tance dur i ng a str i ke are 
another top i c  area where a f ine l in e  cannot be determi ned between r i ght 
and wrony . An argument can be pre sented by management t h 0.t government 
as s i stance or subs i d i zati on of str i kes may well up set  the re l at i ve 
bargai n i ng pos i ti on between management and uni on. Management ' s  case  i s  
that publ i c  funds make for more and l onger str i kes  and cos t l i er settl e ­
ments . Labor ' s  repl y woul d b e  that the i s s ue i s  g i v i ng ai d to needy 
peopl e and n ot compe l l i ng workers  to s ett l e for unjus t terms . Uni on 
off i ci al s feel  that wi thout suc h  pub l i c  ai d, str i ke s  woul d become i n-
effect i ve .  
The three maj or government programs from wh i ch s t r i kers rece i ve 
a i d are : welfare , unempl oyment compensati on and food stamps .  " In al l ,  
we l fa re handouts to str i kers ar·e expected to e xceed $329 m i l l i on dol l ars  
6 1  
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th i s  year  ( 1 9 73 ) - a l most a mi l l i on dol l ars a day . "  
A Wharton Study i nd i cates that, i n  at l east 30 states, general 
a s s i stance wel fare i s  a va i l abl e i mmedi atel y to those pl eadi ng i nd i gence . 
And, after a one-month wa i t i ng peri od, st r ikers can co l lect Ai d to 
Fami li es � i th Dependent Ch i l d ren ( AFDC) i n  2 3 states . T he general 
ass i stance we l fare i s  genera l l y pai d out of l oca l funds. I ts guidelines 
are si m i l ar to federa l  regu l ations as to e l i gi bi l i ty .  The wel fare is  
prov i ded  to  those who cannot meet thei r bas i c  needs of  l ife . Except for 
certi f i cat i on problems, reg i strat i on of those el i gi b l e, l ocal wel fare 
ord i nances are stri ct in thei r appl i cat i on .  T he other we l fare program 
(AFDC ) i s  r egul ated  by federal and state agenc i es . This a i d  i s  ovail -
aLh: 30 d ay s a fter a :; tr i ke i n  the form uf  a c a s h  g ra n t . CErta ii"i 
requi rements , s uc h  a s  the amount of l i qu i d  assets, must be presented i n  
order to  qua l ify . 
Str i kers also recei ve a i d  through unemployment  compensat i on .  
After a s hort wai t i ng peri od ,  t his type of aid is  ava i l ab l e i n  o l y  two 
states ,  New York a nd Rhode I s l and . Other states have more str ingent 
regu l ati o n s  con cern i ng  el igibi l ity .  
Food stamps a re the most i mportant a id- to-stri kers . They are 
avai l ab ·l e immed i atel y i n  every state as soon as a strike be g i n s . I n  
order to  q ual i fy for  a i d ,  l i qu i d  a s sets mu st  be  under $ 1, 500 . HovJever, 
if  a str i ker i s  author i zed to rece i ve AFDC a i d  he i s  automa t i cal ly 
Z/ Readers '  D i cie st , " L et ' s Stop S ubs i d i z i n g Stri kes , "  October , 
1 97 3 , p p . 103� 109 .  
S/ I b i d . , p .  109 . 
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qu a l i f i ed for food stamps regard l e s s  of l i qu i d  a s s ets . 
The Departme nt  of Heal th , Educa ti on and Wel fare i s  examin ing 
food s tamp regulat i on s  as to stri kers . Amendments offered by HEW 
Department are : ( 1) al ternat i ve A wou l d permit � state to exc l ude 
payments  to famil i es where the father ' s  un employment resu l ts from 
part i c i pat i on in a l abor d ispute or (2 ) alternat i ve B retai n s  the hours ­
of-work  test  a s  the sol e s tandard for determi n i ng e l igib i l i ty . The 
Hou se of Repre s entat i ve s  pas sed , by a one vote margin , a l ternative B .  
The resu l ts  a re t h at  fami l y  a i d and food s tamps s t il l are ava i l a b l e to 
str i kers . 
Maj or amounts of a i d become a va ila bl e  after a 30 day waiti ng 
per i oo . For  ·i n s tance , i n  lYi O , wnen a Uni ted Auto Wor r<ers ! s trike  fund 
of more than $ 120  m i l l i on wa s exhausted , General Motors s trikers col­
l ected $30 mil l i on i n  publ ic a id . 9 The requ i rements  for publi c a i d  are 
exten s i ve .  Mos t  s trikers who are e l i gible for a i d  con s t i tute those 
c l as s i f i ed as  being in 1 1need 1 1 • 
The showdown on Capito l  Hil l between organ i zed l abor and bus i-
ne s s  over we l fa re a i d  to stri kers i s  not c ompl ete . The  campa i gn wi l l  no  
doubt continue for many years . The  fundamenta l  question a ppears to be 
the r i ght of s trikers dur i n g a work  stoppage . A common ph i losophy is 
that a str i ke r  h a s  foregone some basi c rights  because of hi s or her 
parti cipat i on in a str i ke  . 
.Vsu s i ne s s  \.lee k ,  March 2 4 , 1 97 3 ,  p .  50 . 
UN I ON F I NANCES 
The u ses o f  l abor funds wi l l  cover two areas : ( 1 )  pol itical 
contributions and ( 2) str i ke fu nd s . 
Pol itica l Contribution s 
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A s i gn i ficant devel opmen t in union goal s has occu rred . Unions  
find themsel ves in  the pol i ti cal forefront of  campaign s .  The l e a ders of 
union s have al ways procl aimed that thei r pri mary i nterest i n  pol itics is 
to ach i eve s ufficient economic power to protect the interests of the 
workers . However , the ir  primary objective has become the acquisition of 
po l it i cal power . Hence, "the union i sts ' goal i n  the next decade is to 
domi nate government at al l l evel s, i n  al l areas of respons i bi l ity and to 
use government as a prime source of  power to wi n econ omic and other 
a i ms . 1 1 10 The same goal s cou l d al so  be attri buted to other groups , s uch 
as bu sines ses. 
Unions p l ay a growing f i nancial ro l e  in pol it i cs . Spending by 
l abor u nion s  in d i rect support of presidential and congres sional can­
didates has been steadil y increa sing . I n  1 956 , l abor unio n s  accounted 
for 8 percent of al l direct pol itica l spendin g on national - l evel can ­
d i dates, and by 1968 , the union s hare had increased to more than 10  
1 1 percent . Unions  were , in fact , the number one group that spent the 
most money ( 1 0 mil l ion do l l ars ) in the 1 97 2  el ection s for support of 
1.Q/Bakke , Kerr, and An rod ,  Union s , Ma nagement and the Publ ic 
( New York , 1 967 ) ,  p .  7 20 . 
Wu . s .  News & Worl d Report , " Labor ' s  Tactics in 1 7 2  Campaign , "  
Ocotber 2 3 , 1 9 7 2 , p .  1 9 . 
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1 1their 1 1  c and i dates . The Mi nneapol is Tri bune on March 18, 1 973, stated 
that the ' 'AFL-CI O  pol iti cal arm spent more [ money] in election than other 
grou p s" . (See Ta bl e 17 . ) 
Table 17 . Un i ons Organizati on s That Spent More Than $ 150, 000 i n  1 97 2  
E l ect i on s . 




Commu n i cat i on Workers 
Garment Workers 
Laborers 
Mach i n i sts 
R� i l  w;iy Cl erk s 
Reta i l  C l e rk 
Seafarers 
Stee 1 \✓orkers 
Teamsters 
Trans po rtat i on Workers 
$1, 270, 075  
89 1, 3 32 
254, 469 
603 , 2 3 0  
178, 889 
37 5, 8 1 7  
268 � 49 1  
239, 450 
305, 7 1 1  
401, 207 
1 57, 1 12 
262, 464 
Source :  M i nneapoli s  Tri bune , March 18, 1 97 3, p .  1 .  
La bor un i ons can no longer ma ke d i rect  pol it i cal donati ons . The 
finances for poli ti cal campaigns are through the " voluntary " politi cal 
a s se s sments . Onl y  four state s, Pennsylvani a ,  Texas, Indiana, and Wi s ­
consin , prov i de l i m i ts to u n i on poli tical contri buti ons . Members may 
als o  be expelled for not pay ing as ses sments for poli t i c al campai gn funds . 
In  addition to pol iti cal c ontribu t i ons, la bor uni ons wi ll be 
spend i ng mi l li ons  more i n  educat i ng thei r members on campa i gn i s sues, 
reg i ster i ng  voters, launc h ing get-out-the- vote dri ves , and for other 
poli t i c a l  p u rpo ses that do not di rectly i nvolve c ontr i b uti ons to 
political c andidates .  For examp l e ,  numerous u nion headqua rte rs are 
located i n  Wash i ngton � D . C .  These organizations provide �for effective 
l obbying in congress. 
Political campa igns are spearheaded by the AFL -C IO 's Committee 
6 5  
on  Pol itic a l  Education ( COPE) . The committee elected 5 7 . 5  pe rcent of their 
congressiona l  candidates, ma ny of which were involved in ma rgina l  con ­
tests . Union fi n ances and various other pol itical activities helped 
friend l y  candidates to better present themselves to the public . 
Unions use political contri butions to secure congressional 
candidates that will support labor issues. The idea  that money can win 
votes should not be underrated. The following tibl e gives some indica ­
ti on as to unions ' poli tical power. 
Tabl e 18. L abor 's Power in the 1972  Congress .  
I n  the House 
-362  cand i dates for House seats w2re 
endorsed by the AFL - C IO  
- 2 18 of these won , and 1 44  lost 
-All told: 2 31 House membe rs were 
thu s e xpected to support most 
labor- backed mea sures 
-This represents a gain for labor 
of 39 House seats 
I n  the Senate 
- 29  candidates for - Senate seats 
we re endorsed by the A FL - C IO 
- 1 6 of these won ,  and 1 3  lost 
-All told : 57  Senators are thus 
expected to support most la bor­
backed measures 
-This repre sents a gain for l a bor 
of 4 Senate seats .  
Source : U . S .  News & Worl d Re port , "Meaning of the ' 7 2 vote to labor 
un i o ns , " Novembe r 20 , 1 9 72 . 
L a bor 's  power in congress can be  examined by looking at var ious 
committee assi gnments. For example , most l abor l eg·isl at ion ord i na rily 
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must clear throu g h the Senate l abor and publ ic wel fare committee before 
Senate consideration . However , as Senator Rus s ell B .  Lon g expla i n s , 
"The commi ttee i s  or i ented towa rd organ i zed l abor . 1 1 It  is not hard to 
understand why few b i l l s  come out of commi ttee wh i ch l abor doesn ' t  want , 
even i f  they wou l d improve the 1 ot of the worker . 1 2  U n i ons contd buted 
heavi l y  to those  comm i ttee  members i n  the hope of s upport i n  labor-
backed measu res . 
Str i ke Fund s 
A previo u s . ment i on was made concerni n g union s trike funds .  In  
1 970, the United Auto Workers Fund was in exces s of  some 120  mil l ion 
dol l ar s . The strike fund  was buil t from dues and other revenues . I t  has 
been e stimated that the UAW col l ected  over $ 1 m i l l i on i n  a s i ng l e, 
recent year . A l so d u ring a stri ke , unions frequentl y rece i ve gifts or 
borrow from oth er unions to hel p d efray the cos ts of s trike benefi ts ,  
pub l icity , le gal fees , and other expense s wh i ch accompany a strike . 1 3  
T h e  AFL - C I O , in addition , provi de s  assi stance in mak i ng fu nd s availabl e 
to s tr i kers . However , l abor uni on s upport has never depended on the 
nicety of affi l i ation . Consequentl y, l oan s a re made avail ab l e from many 
di fferent l a bor u nions . 
T he imp l i cations of l arge stri ke funds made pos sib l e through 
l oans may run a r i sk of pro 1 ongi ng str i kes . " I t may we 1 1  be, for 
1 21 Reade rs 1 o -i ae s t ,  · " L a bor V i ol ence - /:'. Nat i onal Scanda l , 1 1  
Au gu st , 1 9 7 3 , p .  1 5 5 . 
lll Bl oom an d Northru p , op . c i t . , p . 2 76 .  
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exampl e ,  that the New York newspape r str ike of 1 962-63 was  substanti al l y  
p rol onged because  the Typograph i cal Un i on rece i ved benef i ts approx i ­
mat i ng the i r take-home wages . 1 1 14 T he La�drum- G r i ffi n  Act sought to 
regul ate l abor un i on s  by provi di ng that a l abor organ i zati on hol d i ts 
money sol e l y  for benef i t of the organ i zati on and i ts membe rs . Thu s , 
quest i on s  are often asked as to l abor un i on compl i ance to th i s  act . 
However ,  mos t  workers on str ike must rel y heavi l y  on the i r own resource s . 
T herefore , l abor organ i zat i ons requ i re s ubs tant i al funds i n  order to 
fac i l i tate the i r r i ght to di sagree w i th the te rms  of empl oyment .  
A s  a r e sul t ,  restr i cti on of l abor u n i on s  from i n te rna l  borrowi ng 
woul d cau s e  a c hange i n  the countervai l i ng powe r s  between l abor or­
ga� i zat i on s  and i ndustry .  I nd� str � es c a n  bcrrc� from banks  at p re fe rred 
rates . Con sequ entl y ,  any pol i cy change s mus t  be sel ecti ve i n  nature . 
1i/ s 1 oom a nd Northrup , op . c i t . , p .  277
. 
CHAPTER  I V  
PERFORMANCE 
. The eval uati on  of  labor u nion performance i s  the mos t d i fficu l t  
and i mportant area of  economic anal ys i s  for thi s study . Cri teria used 
to eval uate performance are hard to ascertain in terms o f  bounda r i es as  
wel l as  re l at i ve bases against which performance can be compared and 
mea s ured. I nd 1 1 s t rial organ i zat i on theory u s ual l y  analyzes profit rates , 
p roduction  cost , o utput , and other approp riate cr i teri a as i t  rel ates to 
nat i ona l  economic  goals . Consequentl y ,  thi s study examines l abor un i on 
perfo rmance in terms of exces s i ve wage increases , strike costs and other 
ma rket  c on s i derat i ons that affect ou r n a tional goa l s .  Maj or top ic a�eas 
examined w i n i nclude : ( 1 ) str i ke alternat i ves , ( 2 ) wage settl ements , 
( 3 )  infl ati on , ( 4 ) effic i ency , and ( 5 ) distr i buti o n  of income . 
STR IKE ALTERNAT IVE S  
Government , labor uni ons , i ndu str i es , and the pu bl ic  have a 
common i nterest i n  avoid i n g stri kes . Economic costs due to stri kes are 
h i g h .  Los s incl udes many man-days -idle , taxes , profi ts , wages , and 
stoppages of g oods a nd serv i ces . These are j u st a few reasons  for 
con sider i ng str i ke a l ternat i ves . 
Un i ons have pub l icl y s tated thei r des i re to el i mi nate work 
s toppages . Proposal s are numerou s  to el imi nate the b l i nd -man ' s - b l uff 
games thctt s omet i mes occu r  du r i ng c o l l ecti ve barga in i ng . Year - around 
barga in i ng by j o i n t management  a nd un i on comrni tte� s a re one such  
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alternative to overcome s t i cky bargaining ques tions . T
his procedure 
uses a joint s tudy to determine pos sible solutions for
 next year ' s  
bargaining session . 
Po� sible a l ternatives to strikes are : { 1) injunctions , 
( 2 )  
mediation, ( 3 )  compulsory arbitration, and ( 4) s trike
- no-strike agree­
ments . These are j ust  some of the proposals that ar
e bein g used or 




Strikes involving vital good s and services can e
ntail u se of the 
Taft- Hartley Act . Under this act a president 
can preven t, for 80 days , 
stoppages of  goods and services .  The J ustice 
Department obtains a court 
order requiring workers to go back to their
 jobs. Such an action pro­
vides flexibility in strike deadlines . Afte
r expiration of the inj unc­
tion, if no agreement is concluded, workers m
us t  vote by secret ball ot 
on whether to accept the l ast offer made by
 management . Then if  no 
agreement is  negotiated, Congres s is prese
nted a report by the Presiden t 
with or withou t recommendations for action . 
Also, the act provides that 
" any person inj ured in his busines s or prop
erty as  a result of such 
unl awful s trikes could bring s uit for damag
es against  the offendin g 
un i on . 1 1
1 
I nj unctions have been termed a s  semi-effe
ct i ve .  P residents have 
been reluctant to invoke such a drastic meas
ure for political reason s 
l/s1 oom and Northrup , Economi cs  of La bor Rel ation s  ( I l linois , 
1 965 ) , p .  785 . 
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and  as  a resu l t  the  Taft-Hartl ey Act has been appl i ed on ly  a bout once a 
year s i n c e  i ts adopt i on .  Fu rthermore , workers usual l y  rej ect manage­
ment 1 s l ast offer in expectati on that the f inal  settlement w i l l  be 
h i gher .  I n  add it i on ,  there are l i mi tati ons to the act concerni ng i ts 
app l i cab i l i ty to certa in  segments of the economy . 
States al so have emergency i nj unct i ons to gove rn such 
areas as 
l i ght , power ,  gas and wate r. For i nstance ,  twenty- e i gh
t states prov i de 
for some sort of off 1 c i a l invest i gati on and/or fact f i
nd i ng ;  ten states 
have e nacted compul sory arbi trat i on; and f i ve state
s have prov i d ed for 
se i zure of stru ck  fac i l i t i es to handl e emergency d i s
putes . 2 These laws 
are con s t i tut i onal where confl i ct does occur i n  th
e appl i cat i on of 
i nterstate comme rce undP.r federa l regu l a t i ons . Su
ch s tate and federal  
i nj unct i on power prov i des for c ri t i cal str i kes bu
t fai l s  to supp ly  
fl exi b i l i ty i n  other bargai ni n g  conf1 i cts . 
Med i at i on 
Med i at i on i s  a procedure coupled w i th the i n
j uncti on i n  wh i ch 
th i rd part i es vol untar i l y  offer the i r serv i ces 
to enhance col lect i ve 
bargai n i ng a greements. The Federal Med i at i on 
and Conc i l i at i on Serv i ce 
( FMCS ) i s  a nati onal organ i zati on that prov i des
 unb i ased personnel for 
management and un i on negot i at i ons . Thi s organ i
zat i on prov i des assi s­
tance i n  settl i n g 1 1 st i c ky
1 1  l abor quest i ons . In fact , thi rty days p r ior 
not i ce must be g i ven to the FMCS  i f  a l abor d
i spute e x i sts. However , 
Y 1 b i d . , p .  827 . 
thi s not i ce has become a routi ne that i s  f i l ed automat i cal l y  dur i ng 
contract negot i at i on s. Al so , management and uni on have no obl i gat i on 
to accept FMC S a i d before a cri s i s i s  reached . Neverthel es s , as sis ­
tance by the FMCS i s  us ual l y  accepted. 
7 1  
A new revel a t i on i n  med i ati on procedures i s  cal l ed " Med - Arb ' ' . A 
"Med-Arb " p l an  con s i sts of a combi nati on of med i at i on a nd arbi trati on 
personnel . The med i ator-arbi trator fi rst tri es to get both s i des  to 
agree on a compromi se settl e ent, as a med i ator . I f  some questi on s 
sti l l  are unsettl ed , he c hanges rol es and becomes an arbi trator , wi th 
both s i des  agreeing volunt2ri l y  to accept h i s dec i s i on s ;  he then deter­
mi nes the remai c i ng provi s i on s  of the new contract. Such a proposal as 
" med-ar-b " h as a vo l untary aspect \vh i ch i s  i mportant to both ur. i on and 
management. Consequentl y ., both part ies  cou l d exami ne med i ctt i on per­
sonnel before commi tti ng themsel ves to compu ·1 sory arb i trat i on .  The 
Federa l 1ed i nti on and Conci l iati on Servi ce  provi des the personnel 
neces sary to operate such a p l an. 
Many states a l so  operate med i at i on agenc i es . However , i n  on l y  a 
few states are s uch  servi ces run  as ful l t i me operat i ons .  Al so , the 
cost of med i at i on for state agenc i es i s  u s ual l y  pa i d  for by stri k i ng 
par � i es . The states that operate med i ation serv ices are noted for 
havi ng a h i gh l y  u n i on i zed l abor force . 
Compul s o ry Arbi t ra t i on 
A d rast i c  s tep  to sol 1e barga i n i n g  d i sputes i s  c ompu l sory 
a rb i trat i on . Th i s  i s  a si tuati on i n  wh i ch t h i rd part i es d i c ta te fi nal 
s e ttl emen ts . Arbi tra t i on of contract terms i s  a nasty word for both 
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part i e s .  Mo s t  emp l oyers are as  re l uctant  a s  uni ons 
are to let outs i ders 
determ i ne  contract pro v i s i ons . Th i s lack of
 acceptance by e i the r un� on 
or management i s  probab l y a maj or barr i er 
to u s i ng compulsory arbi tra-
t i on as a so l u t i on to  barga i n i n g d i ffi cul t
i es. 
Compulsory arb i trat i on i s  al so d iff icu l t to
 admi n i ster . Com-
pu l sory a rb i trat i on wou l d requ i re a l abor
 court whe re j udgmen t  d i spu tes 
coul d  be s ettled by l aw .  Countr i es of l
ess i ndustr ial i z at i on , such a s 
Austra l i a  and  New Zealand , u s e  a l abor c
ourt for arb i t rati on purposes . 
However , an i nd u s tr i al nat i on , s uc h  as
 the Un i ted States, wou l d f i nd 
d i ff i cu l ty i n  s ucce s s fu l l y  manag i ng su
ch a court system . Th i s  arb i tra -
t i on program wou l d be q u i te costl y to
 f i nance . I n  add i t i on , a probl em 
Ec:xi sts i n  s taff i ng such  a court sy5le
m . J ud ge s  would neEd speci al i zed 
tra i n i ng i n  order  to dec i de c ontract
 terms . 
Courts h ave attempted to bypass arb i t
rat i on  awa rd s . For i n -
stance , the Supreme Court " has  tende
d to hol d that  court rev i e
1,1J of  
a rb i t rat i on awards i s  i nappropri ate
. " 3 Therefore , arbi tra ti on dec i s i on
s  
have  no  mean s of j ud i ci al  rev i ew .  
W i thout j ud i c i al revi ew , u n i on and 
management wou l d f i nd s uch arb i trat
i on p roced ure s too i nfl exi ble . 
Nevertheless , seve ral s tates h ave p
a s sed l aws ca l l i n g for compul sor
y 
arb i t ra t i on of d i sputes i nvol v i n g  
pu bli c uti l i t i e s . " However , i n  some 
states where these  l aws have been  t
e sted i n  the cou rts , compu l sory 
a rb i tra t i on has been hel d unconst i t
u t i onal when i t  affects i nte rsta te 
li L l oyd Reyn o ·\ d s , La bo r  Ec onomi c s  a
n d  L a bo r  Re l a t i on s ( New 
Jersey , 1 9 70 ) , p .  498 . 
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Str i �e-No- Str i ke Aqreements 
Under th i s  arrangement ( str i ke-no-stri ke agreement ) a uni on 
may cal l a stri ke agai n st the company , but i t  does n ' t  set up an
y 
p i cketl i nes . I n stead , i t  i n structs the 1 1 str i k i n �
1 1  workers to s how 
u p  for thei r jobs as u s ual , and cont i n ue production w i th no s l ow­
downs . However , the workers draw onl y hal f thei r u s ual pay ;  t
he 
rest i s  depos ited i n  a l ocal bank . The company makes matchi ng
 
depos i t s out  of i ts treas ury . If  the 1 1 str i ke
1 1  i s  settl ed q u i ckl y ,  
al l depo s i ts are returned . But i f i t  drags  on, workers and 
company 
l ose s ome o r  even al l of the money, wh i ch i s  then donated to 
communi ty p rojects . 5 
Th i s  pro pos i ti on of a �tr i ke-no- stri ke agreement has 
many bene-
f i ts .  Such a p ropos a l  has the fol l owi ng advantages : 
( 1 )  creates 
pres s u re for both parti es to end str i kes, ( 2 )  p revent
s stoppages of 
goods and serv i ces, and ( 3 )  prov i des a fl ex i bl e t i
me per i od for bargai n ­
i ng .  Work�rs  are faced wi th a constant remi n der 
of the str i ke .  Al so , 
p ubl i c  servants w i th no str i ke cl auses cou l d b
e prov i ded w i th a means of 
l eg i ti mate d i s sent . 
Str i ke-no- str i ke agreements cal l for a cert
ai n  percentage l ost 
each week as the I I  str i ke II conti nues . The
 agreement ca 1 1  s for a s i x to 
e i g ht weeks per i od to resol ve " stri ke"  p
robl ems . A " str i ke "  l asti ng 
f i fty- s i x  d ays  creates a tremendous amou
nt of p res s u re on al l part i e s  to 
end the d i s p ute .  However, i f  no agreem
ent i s  reached , other al ter­
nati ves a re then pos s i b l e .  Opt i ons i n
cl ude a stri ke prov i s i on ,  "Med -
YRob i n son ,  Morton ,  and Ca l derwood , An Int
roduct i on to Economi c 
Reasoni ng ( New York ,  1967 ), p . 107 . 
�Herbe rt Ma rx , ed . , Amer i ca n  Labor 
Today ( New York , 1 965 ) , p . 107 . 
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Arb 1 1 ,  a rb i tra tor , o r  a cost  of 
l i v i n g i ncrease p l u s  the o l d contract
. 
The fl e x i b i l i ty p rov i s i ons  o f  s uc
h an  agreement  shou l d be g i ven sert
ou s 
con s i de ra t i on by u n i on and managem
ent  i n  str i ke -prone i ndu str i es .  
The s tr i ke -no -str i ke a greement appears
 to s o l ve  some probl ems 
previ ou s l y  u nre solved by the other  str i ke al
ternati ves d i s cu s s ed . Never­
thel e s s , n ume rou s  fundamental que
st i on s  need resol ut i on . For i
n stance , 
a dmi n i stra t i on o f  th i s program r
ecommends  that  both company and workers 
pay i nto  a fund . Howeve r ,  no ment i on i
s  made concernin g  un i on s tr i ke 
funds . One need s a system where all t
hree part i es  are pre s sured toward 
contract s ett l eme nts . A certai n perce
n tage of un i on s tr i ke funds  shou l d  
b e  pa i d  each wee k  a s  a ge sture of  u n i on
 sup port i n  res olv i n g contract 
d i sput� s . U s i n g  t h i s  procedure a l l 
part i e s  lose i f  an agreement i s  not
 
reached . Al so , un i on s  st i l l
 retai n the i r power becau se  a
 stri ke can 
s t i ll b e  c alled i f  an agreement i s  n
ot reached i n  six to e i g ht weeks . 
Other c i rc ums tan ce s  are present 1
1here s tr i ke -no- str i ke agreements do  
not 
treat each party fa i rl y .  Fo
r  exampl e ,  empl oyer l abor  co
st s  can be a 
small pe rcentage  o f  the empl oyer ' s
 total c o s t s . Therefore , an empl oye r
 
g reatly benef i ts  because o f  no  wor
k s toppages  wi th a mi n i rna 1  cost  to 
the 
fi rm .  
Appli cabi l i ty c f  str i ke-n o - s tr i ke
 agreements  depend o n  c i rcum­
stances .  U nder  ce rtai n c ond i t i o
ns such a no-str i ke  proposal wou l d wo
rk . 
I n  fact , a l l pa rt i e s  cou l d 
u s e such  a procedure i f  accommodat i
on s we re 
made  to f i t the  s pec i f i cs
 of the c a se . Rea l i s t i ca l l y  
however , no ­
str i ke agreements  w i l l  be  entered  
i nto by on l y a few maj or bargai n i n g 
part i e s . On l y  when the threat o f  c
ompul s o ry arb i trati on i s  present 
wil l  the strike-no-s trike agreement ga i n  pcp Lllarity. Man a gement and 
union s l i ke the open framework of present barga i n � :19 rel at i on ships . 
Strike alternatives have been <l � scu s sed as  to the i r merit and
 
l imitation s .  To protect the publi c ,  the government ha s 
a s ufficient 
i nterest in strikes to regulate col lective bar ga i n
i n g . Pos sibil i tie s 
include government intervention in either un i on s t ru
cture or conduct . 
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T i e cu rrent trend in government policy is  to  reg
u l a te conduct ratl er than 
to enforce any anti trust  po l icy that will 
a l ter l abor union struc ture .  Pro-
cedures s uch as mediation and no-strike agree
ments s houl d be enforced i n  
strike prone i ndu stries . This policy could als
o be coupled wi th guide­
lines in wh i ch inj unctions would be is s ued in
 a systematic manner . 
Chapter two e xami ned some implicat ion s  of 
labor union ant i trust  po l i cy .  
The structure of labor union s wou l d be a i te
red by this to such  an  extent 
that va riou s questions are raised as to uni
on bargaining power in order 
to negotiate with large industries. An
 antitru st policy app l ied to 
l abor u nions mu st al so recognize similar 
changes mu st be con sidered in 
indu strial structure .  T hu s , government 
could provide a s sistance in 
creating an environw.e nt for better barga
ining procedures through regu-
lation of labor u nion conduct. 
WAGE SETT LEMENTS 
Labor union s fol l ow certain guideline
s in bargaining for wage 
increa se s , whic h either  d etermi ne or d
elineate union � econom i c perfor­
mance . Th i s  s ect i on dis cHsscs  these guid
el i nes  in rel ation to perfor­
mance and , i n  addition � br i efl y examines u
nion and nonunion wages . 
Cr i ter i a for Wage Sett l ements 
Many arguments are u sed i n  negot i ati on s  for wage i nc reases . 
D i ffe rent  a s pects  are advanc 0d depen d i ng  on the i r  d es i rab i l i ty i n  
collect i ve barga i n i n g ses s i on s . Neverthe l e s s ,  u n i on cr i teri a for wage 
settl ement s  u s ual l y  i nvolve these gu i de l i nes : ( 1 )  comparabl e wage 
rate s ,  ( 2 )  prod u ct i v i ty ,  ( 3 )  cost-of- l i v i n g  i ndex and (4) ab i li ty to 
pay. 
Campa ra bl e Wa� __l3ate s_ 
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Current  wage level s of empl oyers compe t i n g  for t h e  same grade of  
·1 abor s hould be th (� s ame , I n  other  word s , labor i s  demand i n g equal pay 
eri ng job c 1 as s i f"i<.:at f on s . \✓orkers do d i fferent type :; of j obs i n  every  
i nd u s try . Al so , cond i t i on s  and terms of emp l oymen t  vary among workeY-s 
even w i th i n  a certa i n  i n d u stry . The equa l  pay for equal work  ph i l osophy 
has  been rev i sed to comparabl e wage rates . 
Un i on efforts to appl y comparabl e wage ra tes shou l d have red uced 
geograph i c d i ffe rent i a l s ,  bu t thi s depends  on the marke t  s tructure of 
the i ndu s try and the scope of the co l l ect i ve agreement .  
sou the rn s tates have h i stor i cal l y  had l ower wa ge levels . 
For e xamp l e ,  
So u thern l abor 
u n i on pol i cy has accepted t h i s wage d i fferent i a l . T he s i ze of the 
effect  (wage d i s tort i on ) i s  sma l l er than has often been al l e ged ; why 
un i on s  have not achi eved l arge r d i s tort i on s  by e x ploi t i n g d i ffer i n 9  
e l a st i c i t i e s  o f  la bor demand i s  ore of the more i n tr i g u i ng quest i on s i n  
7 7  
the e conomi cs of  col l ecti ve barga in ing ·.
6 
Comparabl e wage barga i n i ng has res u l ted i n  general wage i n - · 
c rea se s  whe re worke rs are h i ghly uni oni zed and pattern barga i n i n g 
i s  
presen t . For e xampl e ,  a utomobile workers have on occas i on demande
d 
s i mi l ar wage i ncreases to those  rece i ved by steel wo rkers . M
ul t i un i t  
barga i n i ng , where contracts are negotiated for many un i on s , 
h a s  a l so  
enhanced gen era l wage i ncreases . These  condi t i ons  produce a
 wage struc � 
ture that moves i n  response  to var i o u s  key wage settl e
ments . Suc h a 
wage movement  prov i des  for a d i stribut i on of i ncorie 
among var i ou s  wo rk­
ers . For i nstance,  e s t i mate s record that about 7 5  
percent of the total 
i nequ a l i ty of earn i ngs  res ul ted from d i fference s
 wi thi n each occupat i on , 
a nd on l y  2 5  percent from d i fferences among occ
u pat ions i n  average e arn-
7 
i ng l evel s . '  Thu s , the re appears to be a tre
nd i n  narrowi ng of i nd u str i a l 
d i fferent i als i n  wages whi ch i s  fu rther  s u
pported by J ohn Dunlop who 
feel s that key v , age bargai ns c a n  effecti ve
l y i nf l uence the  ent i re wage 
A . 
8 
structure of the mer , can economy .  
Product i v i ty 
I n  order  to e valuate producti v i ty i ndexe
s , certa i n a spects  mu st  
be u nders tood . I nd�xes of output pe r 
man-hour are a rat i o  of con stant 
dol l a r va l u e  of goods and s erv i ces d i
v i ded by output per hou r pai d 
Yll oyd Reyno l d s , op . c i t . , p . 6 7 2 . 
? / L l oyd Reynol ds , o p .  c i t . , p . 2 3 0 . 
e/ B-l oorn a nd  No rth rup ,  o p . c i t . , p .
 389 . 
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whereas the Cen s u s  Bureau applies ou tput per hou r worked . U s i ng the 
Bu reau of Labor S tat i s t i cs me thod woul d al low an aggregate of what 
management does pay for . This  is true because the hours pa i d for are 
i ncreas i n g, wh i l e  t i me worked i s  decreas ing . Workers, through fri r, g e 
benefits , have acqui red pa i d  vacation s  and sick l eave . Therefore, one 
c an ass ume the Bureau of Labor Stati stics esti mate s to be lower than 
those o f  the B u reau of  Censu s .  Both indexes,  however, u se an unwe i gh ted 
man-hou r output figure , wh ich does not adj u s t for i nter i ndustry shifts , 
so that the se i n dexes  have a buil t- i n i nfl a tionary bias. 9 
Product i v i ty indexes g i ve a rough e stimate as to approxi
mate 
growth of indu s tr i a l  sectors . The data are coll ected f
rom f i rm e s ti­
mates i n  g i ve n  i nd u s tr i e s . The coverage of the i nd
ex invo l ve s  l i st 
pri ces , not actua l  prices ,  and does not account f
or i mprovements  i n 
qua l i ty of goods and s erv i ce s . F urthermore , prob
l ems are in curred when 
p roject i ng industri al prod uct i v i ty indexes to indi
v i dua l  fi rms ; con.;e­
quent l y ,  p roduct i v i ty i n dexes s hould not be g i ve
n precis ion in col l ec­
ti ve bargain i ng n egot iations . These index
es p ro vide an ap proximation of 
the ir.crease in dol lar val ue of good s and
 serv i ces . 
The Bu rea u  of L abor Stat i stics computes i
ndexes of output per man-
hou r for al l empl oyees , producti on worker
s, and nonproduct ion workers . 
S i tuat i on s  occu r where s i gnif i cant d i ffere
n ces in prod u c t i v i ty are 
computed between product 'i on and non
producti on  workers. The production 
workers  seem to have a greater produc
t i vity record . Un i on s  that barga i n  
.WB 1oom and North rup , op . ci t . , p .  4
94 . 
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for produc t i on workers c an use output per man-hour onl y fo r prodL ction 
workers . However ,  product i vi ty increases are the comb i ned e fforts  6f 
the who 1 e v.;ork force . Inventi ons and capita  1 goods account for c r· anges 
in productivi ty rather than those changes coming from human effort . 
Consequentl y ,  an a l l employee i ndex wou l d  have to be consi d2red justi­
f i able for an equ i tab l e d i str i b u t i on of income . 
P roduct i vi ty indexes ,  desp i te thei r l ack of prec i s ion ,  are 
frequent l y  accord ed h i gh pri ori t i es .  Unions argue for annua l i mprove­
ment factors in wages s o  workers can buy increased output . I ndustr i es 
do not want to l ock- i n  wages w i th so many cents now and so many cents i n  
the future . Wages , geared t o  an assumed average rate o f  increas i ng 
p,oduct ·i v i ty over the economy as a whol e �  cannot Le accura te for pa r t  i -
cu l ar f i rms . 
Cost-o f-L i vi ng Index 
The consumer pri ce i ndex is one of the most w i del y used sets of 
stat i st � cs  i n  col l ect i ve barga i n i ng negot i at i ons between employer and 
uni on .  F0r· i nstance , "more than 6 1 5 , 000 workers wi l l  recei ve cost-of­
l i v i n g i ncrea ses 1 ,  a resu l t of the January consumer p rice i ndex . " 10 
Th i s  i ndex represents chan ges i n  t he cost of providi n g  food and rent for 
onese l f . Consequent l y s  the consumer  pr i ce i ndex i s  some t imes referred 
to a s  a cost-of-li v i n g i ndex . I t  prov i des a means by which to jud ge 
changes i n  the cost of l ife ' s  necessi t i es . The large increase i n  food 
.,t {; / ,-:....:: u-van Cl a g ue , The Bureau of L abor Sta t i st i cs ( New York , 
1 9 68 ) , p .  
cos t s  ma ke s t he consumer pri ce i ndex an even more strategic 
bar­
ga i ning c ri teri a .  
Cos t- of- l i v i ng i ndexes are computed for major c i t i e s  or geo-
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graph i c  areas of  the  Un i ted States .  I tems accounted for i nc l ud
e food , 
services, d urable and nondurable goods . Th i s i ndex  prov i des 
uni on s w i th 
one of the i r maj or cri ter i a for wage inc rease s .  In fact
, studies  
i nd i cate co rrel ati on between wage i ncreases and increa ses
 i n  the cos t of 
l i vin g . 1 1  Many contracts also inc l u de cla u ses  tha t  
automa ti cal l y  open 
negot i ati on s w i th c hanges  of a given amount in the co
n s umer pr i ce i ndex . 
Even during t?rms of a contract, bargaini ng can b
e reopened wi thout 
vi olation o r  breach  of contract . Therefore, uni
on s and management 
An i ssue  i n  u � i ng a consumer pr i ce index i s  th
at food and rent 
are not neces s a r i l y  good i ndicators as to ec
onomi c product i v i ty .  S uch 
an index may i nd i cate an i ncrease i n  wages
, but the supp l y  of goods and 
serv i ces may or  nay not be available for
 pu rcha se . I n  add i t i on ,  pe r­
centage c h a n ges i n  the  consumer pri ce in
dex are d i ff i cu l t to  equate i n  
terms of wage i nc rea ses . Cost-of-li vi n g  
i ncreases seem to refl ect the 
i nfl a t i or 1 a ry att i tude of someth i n
g for noth i ng .  Therefore , th i s  i ndex 
has  a proper role i n  col lect i ve barga i n
i ng ,  but the emphas i s  gi ven to 
wa ge i ncreases  i s  not comp l ete l y  ju
s t i fi abl e .  
Abi l ity to Pay 
Abi l i ty to  pay i s  based on prof i ts and
 the character of  
1 lJ Gl  corn a r,d orthrup , op . cit . , p . 393 . 
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compe t i t i on i n  t h r  ma rket . Such a criterion � as ab i l ity to pay , i s  the 
l east j ist i f i abl e  i n  v�a ge settl ements. The time per i od of a ssessment: i s  
d i ff i cu l t  to determi ne . I ndustries may consider expenditu res over a 
f i ve yea r  pro gram , whereas un i on offi cial s may be more concerned wi t
h 
next year ' s  un i on e l ect i on. Nevertheless, th i s  gu i del i ne i s  u sed i
n 
c on tract n ego t i at i on s . For exampl e, 1 1 the United States Supre
me Cou rt 
has r u l ed  i n  the case of  a dispute between the Tru i tt Manufac
tu r i n g 
Company and a s teel workers ' u n ion that a refusal by an em
pl oyer  to sub­
stantiate a c l a i m  of  i nabil i ty to pay increased wages ma
y su pport a 
f i nd i n g o f  fa i l ure to bargain i n  good fa ith. 1
1 12 
It  i s  d i ff i cul t for e ven management to determi ne th
e a b i l i ty to 
pay for w�gc i ncrea ses .  The rate of return o� i �v
cstment , wh i ch the 
company i s  e n t i tled to , wi l l  a ffect the ab i l i ty
 to pay wages . A fa i r  
rate of r eturn presents ser i ous  problems i n  d ef
i niti on . F urthermore, 
manageme1 1t i s  rel uctant to make records open t
o uni on i n s pect i on for 
var i ou s  reasons . Consequent l y ,  data  conce rni
n g  a firm 1 s f i nanc i a l 
s tatus i s  s ketchy . Un i on official s  d o  not h
ave enough informa tion to 
proj ect  a f i rm 1 s ab i l i ty to pay . 
The d i fference s  i n  par t i es  dur i n g  negoti
at i on s  may be i n  a l ter-
n a tive me an i ngs and measurements . Cr iter
i a for wage determi nati on  have 
no exact  standard . Therefore , manageme
nt  and uni on mu s t  bargain i n  good 
fai th t o  d etermi ne eq u i tabl e settl emen
ts . N everthel es s ,  c r i ter i a for 
wage settlements  � hou l d rely on produc
t i vity a nd cost- of-liv i ng i n creases . 
--·-------
1 2/ B l oom and Northru p , op .  cit . , p .  39
5 . 
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These  gu i deli nes provi de a better measure for wage i nc reases . Produc­
t i v i ty i r , d  . xe s  allow for wage i ncreases to be noni nflati onary in nature .  
Also, the consumer pr i ce i ndex cons i ders what workers must pay i n  order 
to buy nec e s s a ry good s . Consequently , government poli cy cou l d  regulate 
wage s ettlements as to producti v ity for i nflati ona ry con s i derati ons or 
cost-of-li v ing  1 nc reases for a more equ i table d i str i but ion of income . In 
add i t ion ,  producti vi ty g ti i del ines coul d determi ne wh i ch wage i ncreases 
are exces s i ve .  However � the need i s  for development of better cr i ­
ter i a  for wage settlements . Government i nterference i s  neces sary to 
protect  pub l i c  i nterest . 
Another aspect of wage s ettlements are the d ifferences i n  uni on 
a�d nc�un i on wage s . The foll c�i ng d i scu s s i on w i 1 1  be concer r 1ed wi th  
uni on i mpact on wages . 
Uni on and Nonun i on Wages 
The ex i stence of labor uni ons has i nfluenced all wages . That 
i s, u n i oni zat ion tends to rai se the level of all wages . Nonun i on fi rms , 
i n  order to keep workers , gear the ir  wages toward acceptable levels . In 
add i t i on ,  nonuni on f i rms seek to prevent uni oni sm of the i r  plants by 
follow i ng patterns s et  by un i ons . Employers  have formed assoc i ati ons 
s uch as A . B . C .  (�ner i can Bu i lders and Contractors ) to regu l ate terms of 
employment for the i r  emp l oyees . Consequently , uni on i mpact on wages 
cons i sts of many var i ables . The i solati on of part i c ular var i ables i s  
d i ff i c u l t to d etermi ne . Thu s , tt1 i s d i scu s s i on w i ll concern broad effects 
of uni oni sm on nonuni on wage s truc t ure . 
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I ncreas ed producti v i ty sets  a cei li ng on the i ncreases  o
f real 
wages . I n  o rgani zed markets , for i nstance , i t  i s  frequent l y as serte
d 
that wages are d i rectl y determined wi th i n  u pper and l ower l i m i ts by 
barga in i ng _ power and ma rginal producti vi ty .
1 3  Uni on wage pol i cy ,  wh ich 
is to promote the economi c welfare of the membersh i p ,  i s  thu s  
restri cted 
by economi c reason s . Consequentl y , uni on wage pol i cy is d
i rected at 
shorten ing the time lag between management ' s  wi l li ngne s s  t
o pay ,  and the 
t i me the market makes h i m  pay more . Uni on wage pol icy , 
neverthe l e s s , 
i nvolves pol it i cs . Un i on offi ci al s mu st  have wage ba
rga i n s  that wi l l  
sat i s fy the people who mu st be sat i sfi ed . Income ma
x i mi z i ng ,  i n  other 
words , may not b e  the obj ect i ve .  The con s i d era t i
on frequentl y i s  to get 
an  acceptab 1 e contract . For examr, 1 e ,  u n i  un  cont
racts rray ca 1 1  for 
add i t i 0nal fr i nge benef i ts , s uch as , 
pensi on p l an s  i nstead of l arge wage 
increases . Workers regard these fr i n ge benef i
t  pl ans a s  acceptabl e 
means of payment . Consequentl y ,  un i ons i nfl
uence the form of payments 
i n  terms of layoffs, overti me ,  severance pay
, g r i evance p rocedu res , 
prof i t s har i ng, i nsurance , med i cal care, s
i ck l eave , pa i d  vacat i on s , 
wel fare , and pens i on plans . Most if not a
l l of these are found i n  
nonun i on l abor groups . 
A second  i nf l uence of l abor uni on i sm i
s  i n  the order l i nes s  and 
cons i stency i n  pl ant wage rel ati on s h i p
s . Non u n i on wages are h i gher in 
some i n stances than u n i on wages . Howe
ver, u nion wa ges , as a grou p , tend 
to be h i gher than  nonun i on wages . For 
examp l e ,  i n  the major i ty of  
1 3/ sa k ke ,  Kerr , and Anrod , �s , a n
agement a nd the  Pub l i c 
( New York , 1967 ) s  p .  518 .  
cases , the medi an earni ngs of union year- round , fu l l - t ime workers were 
h i ghe r than those of nonuni on year-round, full-ti me workers ($6, 824 . to 
$5 , 705 ) . 14 Wages a1 so tend to be h i gher i n  highly union i zed i ndustri es 
than i n  "non-uni onized" i ndustr ies .  \forkers " in  u n i oni zeri i ndustries 
rece i ve wage i ncreases s l i ghtl y sooner tna , the i r  nonunion counterparts . 
The earn i ngs of l abor un ion members are esti mated ( H . Gregg 
Lewis ) to be from ten to fi fteen percent h i gher i n  unionized i ndustries 
i n  relati on to nonun i on workers . One can expect wages on the average to 
be h i gher than nonuni on wages . For i nstance, l abor uni on members have 
h i gher medi an earni ngs than the i r  nonunion counterparts worki ng i n  
1 5  s i mi l ar occupat i ons i th the same i ndustry groups . Obv i ous l y 3  uni ons 
have the effect of  pi essuri ng wage i ncreases . 
Labor Un i ons  and Industry Infl uence on \•Jaaes 
Labor un ion structure i s  s i mi l ar to that of i ndustry .  In 
additi on ,  l abor unions  and i ndustry are the mai n  determi ners of wage 
i ncreases . The re l ati  ns h i p between unioni zation and i ndustri al con­
centra t i o ns has promoted several s tudi es as to the i r  i mpact on wages . 
The fo l l owing di scuss ion examines l abor union and i ndus try structure 
w i th res pect to wage rates . 
Several s tud i e s have concluded that , on the bas i s  of an exami na-
t i on  of avai l a b l e  e .p i r i cal evi dence, at l east for certai n time peri ods 
Wu . s .  Oepar�rient of Co ,merce , B ureau of  the Cen s us , Popu l a t i o n s 
C haracteri st i c s : La  or U n i cn t ' er.he rs h i p  i n  1966  ( WasL i nqton , D . C . , 
197 1 ) , p .  1 .  
l S / I b i d - s p .  3 .  
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and i ndustr i al sectors, a greater  rate of increase i n  wages has been 
s trongl y  corre l ated  wi th these three variabl es : ( 1 )  strong un i on ,  
( 2 )  
h igh degree of monopoly and (3) h i gh prof i ts .
1 6  Tre i ndustr i al sector 
stud i es deal w i th wages i n  manufacturing industr i es .  A rel at i v
el y 
strong union i s  a ssoci ated with a l arge propo rt i on of prod
uct i on workers 
covered by col l ect i ve agreements . Th� secona variable 
( h i gh degree of 
monopol y  power) i s  measured by concentrat i on rati os ba
sed on the value 
of shipments . The degree of monopoly power can fu
rther be seen in  h igh 
profit rates . The th ird correl ated var i able measure
s corporate profi ts 
before taxes . A conclusion of these studies wa s 
that attempts to i so­
late the. separate effects of each var i abl e on
 wages by mu l t i ple re­
gress i on techniques have not been hel
pful ; t h i s fa i l ure h� s been due to 
the high degree of intercorrelation among th
e va ri ables thernselves .
17 
However, Albert Rees su ggests that data for 
the whole economy 
woul d be much l ess l i kely to show strong
 associ at ion between union i -
zat i on, and enterpr i se monopoly and wag
e i ncreases . In  oth e r  words, 
i ncl u d i ng non-manufactur ing i ndustries, s
uch as transportati on, ut i l-
i t i es, s erv i ces, f i nance, cons truct i on
, trade, government, mi ning, and 
agri culture , woul d re sult i n  either i n
s ign i f i can� or sli g htl y negat i ve 
correl a tion . Some research fi n d i ngs s
uggest such conclusions are found 
when ana l yz i ng the  whole economy . 
.!§I R  i cha rd Rowan , ed . , 1 1 Un i on ism, Co
ncentrat i on, and Hage 
Chan ges : Toward a Un i f ied Theor
y, "  Read i nq s  in Labor Econom i c s  and 
Labor Relat i on s , 197 2 , p .  454 . 
lZI I b i d . , p. 455 . 
Consequentl y, fi ndings suggest that the un i on i sm- concentrati on 
rel ation s h i p  rel ates only to the manufactur i ng s ector. Th ·i s  re
sults 
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from using data from two di fferent markets; a man ufacturin
g sector of 
concentration rel ation i s  much l ess preval ent in the non-manuf
acturing 
sectors and  that wage increases i n  strongly union i zed, hi
gh l y competi­
t ·i ve non-manu facturing industries are at least as grea
t as those in the 
s trongl y unionized, ol igopol i s tic manufacturing s ecto
rs . 18 Therefore,  
th i s expl ana tion woul d hel p  resolve some d i fferenc
es in theories .  For 
exampl e ,  non-manufa�turing firms, because  of the p
hysical  l imits w i thin 
which new entrants can effectivel y produce , al l o
w l abor union s  key areas 
or ci ties of organization . Unions, once  orga
n ized, can effecti vel y 
barga i n  w i th compe titive firms . I ndustri e
s , s u ch as transportati on and 
mari t i me ,  create environments favorabl e  f
or col l ecti ve  bargai ning. 
INFLAT ION 
Probl ems of infl ation are becoming more 
acute as the age of 
scarcity is becoming a real it y .  For e
xampl e, "The over- al l who l esal e 
price index for Augu st, 1973, increased
 5 . 8 percent on an unadj usted 
basi s and 6 . 2  percent after being  �d
j usted for seasonal vari ation ; i t  
was not a record, but was the bigg
est s i n gle monthl y increase since 
1 9  
1946. " No l onger can the United S
tates or oth er i ndustrial nations 
count on cheap resources from u nde
rdevel oped nat i ons . I nf l ationary 
difficul ti es h ave al so been refl ect
ed with the consumer pri ce index 
lB/ 1 b i d . , p .  460.  
191 s ; ou x  Fa l l s  Argus  Leader, September
 8, 1973.  
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ris i n g 8 percent i n  1 973 . A better understandi ng of i nflation can als o 
be ga i ned by look ing at the i ndustrial component of v,holes ale pri ces . It 
is  "more sign i f i cant a s  an index of the u nderly i ng inflationary trend 
becaus e  i t  is  l i ttle i nfluenced by s hort-run s upply fl uctuat i on . 1 1 20 At any 
rate, infl at i on has become a major problem in the effort to ma i ntain our 
economic stab ili ty . 
The next section s will discu s s  cost-pus h  inflation and how i t
 
rel ates to government poli cy. The Ken nedy a n d  rn xon admi n i s
trati  on s 
will be briefly rev i ewed to prov ide i n sights about the pr
oblems of 
fi ghting i n flation. 
Cost- P u s h  Inflation 
Lab or un ion s' effects on cons umer pri ces  have be
en often re­
ferred to a s  cost-push  i nflation .  Cost-pus h  i n
flati on i n  turn is  trans ­
lated into the laywan
1 s wage-pri ce spiral. Th i s s p i ral has been i
n  
nearly cont i nuous confli ct wi th the national g
oal of pri ce stab i l i ty .  
I n  a dynami c  economy Hi th an aggress i ve labor
 movement 1 1 many economi sts 
beli eve th at pers i stent union pressure for 
h i g h wages must i n  the long 
run produce e it her  unempi oyment or  cont i n
u i ng i nfl ati on . "
2 1  I f  manage­
ment and labor seek to �a i nta i n  the ir  rel
ati ve s hare of wage s  and 
profi ts , c o n s i derabl e p res s u re on pr i ces  
i s the re su l t .  For examp l e ,  
management can grant wage increa ses due
 to i ncrea ses i n  producti v i ty .  
However, wa ge i ncreases  beyond ga ins i n
 produ cti v i ty present a d ;lemma 
20/ Economi c Report o f  the Pres i dent ( Ha s hington , 197 2 ) , p .  43 . 
2 1/ s i oom and  Northrup , op . c i t. , p. 52 5 . 
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to managen ent . The al ternat i ve to management ' s i ncrease i n  un i t  l abor 
cos ts i s  to automate production or to l ower costs through other means .  
Consequentl y, product i on i s  i ncreased and pri ces and profi ts rema i n 
relat i vel y stable. Workers a l so have more money to buy the addi t i onal
 
outptJt. Neverthel es s ,  a cri tical l i m i t i s  reached when wage i ncrea
ses 
produce µ r i ce increases. From th i s point on creeping i nfl ation 
or the 
wage-pr i ce spi ral becomes a real ity. In short, wage i ncreas
es  infl uence 
empi oyers to raise prices i n  order to mai nta i n  profits .  Uni
ons , because  
of i ncreased prices : demand add i tiona l  wage increases .  Thu
s, the cyc i e 
repeats itsel f .  
Workers no l onger need to have strategi c  or techni ca
ll y key j obs 
i n  order lo sec.;ur8 vJa.qe i nc r eases, ra ther the rna
Jor factor is the deqrec 
of unionizat i on of parti cu lar workers .  Cou nterva i
l i ng power becomes an  
i mportant as pect in union vers us industry v-1age 
bargai ning. D i fferences 
i n  industr i al and u n i on structure determine at
 l east in part the major  
rol es each wil l pl ay in wage increases. For
 i n stance, a modern theory 
of  wages , wh i ch recogni zes the power i n  th
e hands of group s  of l aborers  
by  direct acti on to rai se thei r money i ncome
s , permi ts recognition of 
the pos s i bl e  role played by organized l abo
r i n  the infl ati onary proces s .
2 2  
Labor uni ons , through annual improvement
 factors and cost-of­
l ivi n g prov i s ions , tend to feed monetar
y and fiscal inflat i on .  The 
annual imp rovement factors that stem from
 i ncreased productiv i ty over 
the whol e economy should be recei ved by al l
 i ndustrial sectors . 
. W Edward Chamberl in, The Economic Analys ·i s of L abor Un i on Pm·1er 
(\4asn i  n g ton, 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 27 . 
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I ndustr i e s , however, s houl d not be geared to a s i mpl e fi xed formul a.
 
�!age s  s hou l d be fl exi bl e  among i ndustr i e s  based on producti vi ty 
chang2s .  
A fixed annua l  wage i ncrease woul d p revent indu s tr i e s  from ex
pand ing and 
contracti n g i n  order to meet chan gi ng l abor demands.  The foll
owi ng 
excerpt add s  s upport to the above recommendation : " general 
wage ad j u st­
ments of a uni form amount te!1d to attach an undul y large 
amount of , abor 
to dec l i ni ng i ndu str ies and make i t  more di ffi cult for ex
pand ing industries 
to obta i n labor . 1 1 2
3  
Another factor i ncrea s ing wages i s  t h e  cost of  l i v i n
g provis i ons . 
Automa t i c  cost of l i ving increases , because of cha
nges in  the consu�er 
price i ndex, p revent any ti me lag in wage i ncreas
es. Thus, wage and 
pri ce i ncreo se s  can feed each other i 1 , the form
 of a wage- price s p '. ra 1 . 
An argument can be presented for non-i nflati
onary wage behavi or 
whi ch calls for wage i ncreases  to equal the 
trend r ate in producti v i ty. 
For examp l e ,  a 3 . 5  percent trend rate of pr
oducti vi ty \•;ould a l l o\\1 wages 
to inc rease the same amount i n  order to c
onsume availab l e good s . The 
fol lowing di scu s sion wi ll proceed to eva
luate an aspect of thi s argu­
ment . Tab l e 19  presents the e�p i r i cal da
ta for d i s c us s i on .  From 
the table one can conclude the fol lowi n
g : 
W Bl oom and North rup , o p . ci t . ,  p .  
39 9. 
Table 19. Producti v i ty and �a ges. 
Criteri a 
Output per man-hour 
Compensation per man-hour 
Labor costs per unit of output 
Wholesal e price index 









196 5 - 67 
7 . 8 
17 . 8  
9. 4 
5. 6 
7 . 6 
Source: Ewan Clague, The Bureau of Labor Statistics ( New York, 1968 ) ,  
p .  121. 
It  is evident that for the period 1960- 64, the annual gains 
i n  pers onal compensation remained within a rea sonab l e range for 
the �.nnu;i l  i r crec. s es ir product i vity . . . .  Hcwever , as the !1at 1 0r. 
a pµroached fu l l emp l oyment in 1965 -67, the annua 1 gains in com­
pensation rose faster, while productivity increase s  s l ackened . 
Over {he three years, compensation rose  twice a s  much a s  product­
ivity. Both price indexes res ponded by r i sing s harply. 24 
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According to this evidence, inflat i on appears to be caused by 
wage i ncrea ses that have s urpas sed productivi ty, but this interpretation 
needs s ome clarification. Output per man hour is co�puted using a 
base year for constant dollar val ue of goods and services .  However, 
compensation per man-hour doe s  not represent rea l earnings recei ved by 
workers . Re al average hourl y earnings would be more appropri ate. 
Exces s demand c an be cau s ed by 9overnrnent s pend i ng or by forei gn demand . 
A study mus t be done for particular indu stri es to see the impact of 
wage increa ses on prices.  
24/ Ewan Clague, op. cit. , p. 121. 
9 1  
Another factor i nfl uenc i ng i nfl at i on i s  l abor union att i tude 
toward wage c uts. Un i on pol i cy i s  qui te i nfl exi b l e  as far as  any down­
ward movement i n  wages . " A basi c reason for uni on oppos i t i on to wag
e 
reducti ons i s  that there i s  no assurance that a g i ven change i n  
wages 
w i l l  be assoc i ated wi th a correspond i ng chan ge i n  l abor cost , or 
with 
any pred i ctab l e c hange i n  costs of pri ce s. 1
1 2 5  Un i on pol i cy i s  that 
product i v i ty gai n s  wi l l  not be passed on i n  the form of  lower
 pr ices . 
Conseq t tently, workers expect v,age i ncreases regard l ess c
f economi c 
cond i t i ons. Also, uni on offi ci a l s that accept wage dec
reases face 
pol i t ·i cal d i saster for themsel ves. Therefore, vrnge
 rates are typica l ly 
r ig i d rather than fl exi bl e .
26 Next year ' s  el ect i on could hinge on 
contr� ct  resu l ts . 
Government I nflation Poli cy 
Wage-pr i ce gui del i nes were used under the Ke
nnedy Admi ni stra -
t i on .  Po ·1 i ci es c a  1 1  ed for non - i  nfl a_ti onar
y \.;age behav i or to equal the 
p roducti vity i nc rease based  on vol untar
y compli ance of  i ndustry and 
l abor. Under these pol � c i es an industr
y wi th  r i s i ng product i v i ty and 
constant costs •,•rns s ho\'m to have " exce s
si ve I I  profits. Thus t�ese guide -
1 i nes cal led for a p r i ce  decrease of  tha
t part i cu l ar  product . 
Vol untary v,age -pri ce gui dr:l i nes \'✓e re admi
ni stered from 1960 to 
1963 . T he  Kennedy Admi n i strat i on ar
gued w i th uni ons and indus tries to 
£/s1 ooni and Northrup , op. cit. , p . 3
99 . 
2 6 / R i cLard Rm·1an, ed . ,  Read i ngs i n  Labor Econ
omi cs and Labor 
Rel a t i on s  ( I l l i no i s ,  1968 ) , p. 438 . 
exerc i se restrai nt i n  order for these g u ideposts to become effecti ve .  
The vol untary pol i cy was part i al l y successfu l i n  retardi ng infl ati on 
a ccording to some experts ; however, a n at i ona l  trend of output per man­
hour is not the producti v i ty trend  in a parti cu l ar fi rm or industry .  
Co nsequentl y, the g u ideposts were too genera l  in thei r application . 
Unions comp l a ined that nonun i o� workers were not fol lowin g such gui de­
l i nes ; as a resu l t, un i on members were bei ng den i ed equa l  wage increases 
because of the i r  un i on memberships. I n  additi on, unions stated that 
f irms h ad excessi ve profi ts and were not l owering  prices. Labor un i ons 
further a rgued that stab i lization controls were not even- handed and  that 
all costs , prices, profits, rents, and executive compensat i on , as ��ell 
a s  the v:ages a nd  sa l ar i es cf empl oyees, s houl d be rf:!gulated . As a 
resu 1 t, neither u n i ons nor industries practiced restraint in fell owi ng 
the guidel ines . Clearly the approach of vol untary restraint was effec-
t i ve for only a l i mi ted duration. 
P resi dent N i xon, under the Economic Stabilization Act, worked 
for compliance to ,..,age-price contt·ols. The admin i strati on recogn i z ed 
the i mportance of enforci ng v1a ge-pri ce controls. However, the effec­
tiveness of N i xon ' s  compreher,sive control s i s  somewhat questi onabl e. 
The fi rst two wage -pr i ce c ontrol p ases appeared to retard the i nfla ­
t ionary psychology of the market. l abor u n i ons su ggested that these 
control s were lack i ng  in enforcen�nt , i n  appl i cati on, and i n  reduci n g  
infl at i on a ry pressu res . Admi n istra i on of  wage-pr i ce control over l arge 
i nd ustrial sectors is in itself a difficult probl em. Consequently , 
enforcement of wage -pr i ce con .!· ro 1 s over nonunion wa.ges in ou r economy 
was e s pec i ally arduous . Negotiati ons of nonuni on wages, because of the 
smaller n umber of workers involved , di d not receive suffi ci ent re gula­
tion . For i nstance, labor uni ons wanted a s tudy to be done on nonunion 
wa ges i n  the con structi on industry because uni on offi cials felt that 
such wage increase s  we re not wi thin the gui delines. Labor unions al s o  
indicated their di sapproval in  the application of  wage-price controls . 
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The argument  was that controls over i ndustry prices and profit s allowed 
greater flexibility. In additi on ,  labor unions saw no retardin g of pent­
up inflationary press ures. Uni on workers were recei ving les s pay, and 
pr i ces nevertheles s kept increa� � ng. The argument was tha t wage-pri ce 
central s had little effect on controlling i nflat i on. Consequently, indu s ­
trial and un i on d i s satisfaction wi th present cont rols seems to di c tate 
that such poli cy wil l play a s ubord i nate role i n  economic stabilization .  
John K. Galbraith suggests that wage increases that are held to 
require a price increase might be subject to ratificat i on by a publi c 
tribunal or by a board on which representatives of  management, labor, 
and the public participate. In other words , a s tudy is needed to 
determine the i�pact of wage increases on pr ice s .  Evi dence s�gges ts 
that future po 1 i cy may rely on suc h  a procedure . 1 1 The cos t  of 1 i vi ng 
counci l  is already negoti a t i n g  with o uts i de economi c  consul tants to 
develop an i nput- output model that would s how the impact of wage and 
price change s, i ndustry by i ndustry and would also trace the impact ?f  
a particul ar price h i ke on over-all pr·i ce indexes. 1 1 27 
2 7/Bu s i nes s Week, September 1 5, 1973 ,  p. 5 5. 
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Ano ther possi b i 1 i ty avai l abl e  to a i d  g overnment in deal i ng wi
th 
infl at i on pol i cy woul d be structure and conduct cons i dera t i ons 
for 
i ndustry and l abor unions. If l abor un i ons and i ndustry can
not he l p  i n  
s o lvi n g  i nfl at i on ,  compet i tion �ay have to be fostered t
hrough appl i­
cation of anti trust l aws or other means. Changes i
n  l abor uni on struc­
ture  have an impact on bargaining rel at i onsh i ps wi th 
i ndustry. The 
bal ance of market power necessary between l abor
 unions and i ndustry for 
compet i ti on is extremel y compl ex .  The provi sion
s devel oped for anti ­
trust for l abor unions woul d have to be sel ect
ive i n  order to create the 
des i red competit i on. Consequentl y ,  the gover
nment i s  rel uctant to use 
antitrust pol i cy on a general bas i s. Thus 
a better po l i cy woul d be to 
1_1 se · 1  a bor un i ons and i n dustry as economi c 
p � anners ·1 n yuve t·r 1rnent . 
Once the structure and conduct of i ndust
ry and l abor unions are under­
stood , g overnment can direct its attention
 towards achieving desirabl e 
publ i c  goa l s. 
Labor uni ons' rol e w i th respect to the p
robl em of i nfl at i on has 
been d i scussed. Certa i n  l abor uni on
 restr i ctive practices �,ere found to 
i nfl uence economic efficiency and th
us such practi ces can resul t  i n  
cost-push i nfl at i on. Attent i on wi l
l  now b e  centered on  uni on pol i cy 
factors that i nfl uence economi c eff i
c i ency. 
EFF IC I ENCY 
Labor un i on pol i cy concerni n g  empl
oyment cond i t i ons such as 
l ayoffs ,  overt i n ,e ,  g r ·i evance proce
dures, seni or i ty and automation affect
 
a f irm ' s  p1 ·oduct i v i ty . T •:o un i on p0
 l i cy factors are seni o r ity and 
automat i on .  These  · , i l l b� ar"1a l yz ..... d 
· n  regav-d -:n product iv i ty .  
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Uni 0n · favo s en i or i ty for workers becau se of the  securi ty 
prov i ded by su..,h an _agreem · nt . 1 1To vmrkers , one of the most s i gni fi cant 
contr i but i on s  f un i ons  has been the improvement of  worki ng rul e s , 
· t · f 1 · . . 28 proi.:ec · , on ro· , emp oyer  d i ctati on a nd an  i ncrease i:1 sec 11r , ty . 1 o  Hor kers , 
d u e  to the i r ·� � me ·i ves tmeJ1t wh i ch cannot be rep 1 ace<l , fee l that a 
vested i nte rest i s  a cqu i red i n  the i r j ob ri ghts. Arb i trary noti ons of 
manage�ent d o  r ot d ictate r i ghts over a person's j ob. Workers wi th the 
longes t  serv i ce do have greater equity i n  any j ob  l ayoff or terminati on .  
Many factors a e c i ted i n  advocati ng seniori ty con s i derat i ons . For 
i nstance, an i ,  roved work i ng force can be equated wi th j o b  securi ty . A 
worker can Le �eli eved of tr.e constant pres s u re surroundi n g h i s j Qb 
because alternat i ve j obs may not offer seni or i ty r i ghts eq u i val ent to 
the i r  present job. 
Busi necs fi rms, nevertheles s,  take a different approach to 
sen i o  ity clauses . Management views senior i ty prov i s i on s  as li mi ting 
i ts right to m .nage vital a spects concerning product i on. Heavy e�phas i s  
on sen f o r i ty, ar gues managen.ent , wi l l  n ot only reduce effi ciency but 
a ·t s o l a bor mobi ·· ; ty. The p , 1 · 1 os ophy of management  is that sen i ori ty 
over val ues ex . eri ence and c reates ar  older v10rk force . TL i s older work 
force tends toward rred i ocrity becau se  of job security provi ded by length 
cf  serv i ce. For i nstance , union controls over h ir ings, layoffs, and 
promoti on by sen i or i ty ten d to establi sh a complacent work force that 
W Rob ·i nson > l .orton , and Cc:ld rv ood, p .  cit. , p .  94 .  
does not adj ust to technol og i cal changes. 
Uni ons and management have different op i ni ons concerni ng sen-
·i ori ty . The extreme ph i l osorhi es are not typical of ei ther party �  
management may strongl y support seniori ty under certain ci rcumst
ances� 
whereas young u nion workers may be hi g h l y  cri tical of any se
ni ori ty 
system .  
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The d i fficul ty i n  seni ority ri ghts is i n  thei r degree o
f appl i -
cat i on .  Management and unions basical l y  support seni
ori ty prov i sions. 
Compet i t i ve seni ori ty seems to satisfy most parti es 
i nvol ved in such ct n  
agreement . Competi tive sen i ority prov i des for p
romotions for workers 
w i thin � given range of on the j ob service which
 mnkes the degree of seni or-
i ty more e l a. s t i c than •i n s uch areas as j ob ·1 ayo
tts  and  reca 1 1 .  F urther­
more, quest i ons deal i ng wi th speci fics of sen
i ority in such i tems as 
pl antwi de  or d epartment seni ori ty must be de
ci d ed at a l ocal l evel g i ven 
cond i t i ons of emp l oyment . 
Seni ority may adversel y i nfl uence producti v
i ty i n  that promo-
t i ons may not al ways be recei ved by the mo
st product i ve workers. How­
ever, management, l abor uni ons, and work
ers general l y  support seniori ty 
provi si ons b ased on soci ol ogical and hum
ani tari an grounds as wel l as 
economic grounds . 
Autorrat i on 
Automat i on can be regarded as a cause 
of structural unempl oy-
ment. Techni ca l  i nnovati on demands s
kil l changes among the l abor force 
and reduce s  c ertai n j obs b y  repl aci n g
 man wi th machi ne .  Advantages of 
automat i on center around the product i on 
of goods and· s ervi ces. Th is  
can be done wi th greater s peed , qual i ty, and quantity . The confl i ct 
i nvolve s  what rol e wor�ers  s houl d then perform in the production pro­
ce s s . George � ny, pre sident of the AFL-C IO , warned h i s  con sti tuents : 
Automation can be a b l es s i ng or i t  can be a curse . . . the re i s  no 
·1 0 ger any quest i on in my m i nd as to the direct i on in wh i ch automation 
i s  go i ng today It i s  rapi dly becoming a real cu rse to th i s s oci ety . 
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Managerent, however, v i ews technolog i cal change s  a s  provid i n g a 
better qua 1 i ty of  1 if e for everyone by i ncreas i n g  the qua 1 i ty and 
q uant i ty c f  go s and s ervices . Factory producers s ee "th e  secord 
i ndustrial revol ution " reveali ng i ts e l f to the market system . Elec­
tronic and meet an i cal d ev i ce s  are expand i n g i n  fantasti c n umbers i n  
order to compete wi th a n  e ver i ncreas i ng emand . Human ooservntion , 
dec i s ·i on and  effort are be i ng done v1 i th nev-1 techno l og ·i ca ·i products .  
Managements ' i ,pre s s i on i s  that res tricti ve work pract i ce s  and res i s ­
tance to automati on hinders industry product i on. 
Labor ul i on off i c i als neverthe l e s s  ta ke a more human i s tic 
ph i losophy towa . d the traur-:a faced by worl'ers who can o 1 on ger  be 
employed ir  thei  v e sted s kil ls . L� bor unions d emand that any reduction 
of  j ob s  be done 1 i th satis factory terms for the worker. Con flict is 
Mis t  u s ually no l.,ed  when automation destroys j obs h eld by v✓0rkers . For 
exa 1�·ip l e, a Gen � ral Motor ' s  As sembly Divis ion ( G ·1AD ) el i mi n a ted 400 
h ourl y jobs  at the Norwood  facil i ty . 1 1 Th 0 company d en i ed there Has any 
s pee"u p , s ayi ng  that unneces s ary d u p l i ca t i on was a l l that was e l i m i natzd . " 29  
JJ.lu . s .  Je�,s & i-�orl d Reoor " P.fter �M ' s Long e s t  Str i ke , C l ue s to 
Ur i i on ' s  • -; 3· Goa s , 1 1  October 9, T72 , p .  l OLI . . 
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The s tr i ke l asted 174 days before su bstant i ve i ssues , such as reduced 
work force wh i l e mainta in i ng producti on - l i n e speed , were f i n a l l y  settled . 
Both mana ement and l abor t 1n ion:: want automettion ' s  adjustments 
made without s erious harm to the workers ' we l fare . Several means 
have 
been j ointl y d eveloped to ach ie 1e sat i sfactory agreements .  Stab i
l ity 
for the wor l'er h as been prov i ded by retra i n i ng or pens ion pr
ograms . 
Funds have been al l otted to retra in or prov ide retirement p
ay for 
workers . For exampl e ,  l ongshoremen and mi ne workers have
 been greatly 
affected  by a utomat ) 0n .  Di fferent jobs were el imi nated
 because of new 
mach inery and  i n  many cases, funds  al l otted to g rad
ual job reductions 
were never used because of job transfers or earl
y retirements . 
Un i on and  indus try \JO k ing together  prov � de a nl!
ce : sary stctb i l i ty 
to the automation probl em. The l oss d ue to f i n
ancing gradual job re­
ductions does , however , have soc ial val ues der
ived from such an agree ­
ment. For men and women  to have mean ing i n  l
ife , there must al ways be 
useful t h i n gs to  be done . Our economic syste
m prov ides tax breaks for 
capital deplet i on a l lowances but  allows fo
r no human  dep l etion all ow-
ance . 
Productiv i ty 
Th2 rol e p l ayed  by l abor unions to incr
ease productiv ity is 
important . Better work ing cond i t ions ha �
 been s hown to be compl i­
mentary in i nc reasing l abor product iv it
y. Real increases i n  produc ­
tiv i ty have resu l te d  from i nvent i ons an
d  appli cations of  l arge a, aunts 
of cap i ta l  pe r employee . Consequentl y ,
 the reason i n g  that  l abor u n i ons 
a pply i ncent ives for empl oyers tc ma ke max i mu
m use of the cap i tal cannot 
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Source: Sanford Cohen, Labor in the Un i ted States ( Ohio, 1970 ), p. 397. 
Labor unions and industry have been able to mai ntain their res­
pective shares of nati onal income. Unions have not increased their 
share of national income at the expense of corporate profi ts .  The gains 
of l abor have been due to a decl ining rol e of unincorporated enter­
prises. Part of the sign i ficant change has occurred because of a decl ine 
i n  the n umber of farm enterprises. I n  contrast, expandi ng government 
empl oyment has provided additional jobs to al l eviate empl oyment prob ­
l ems. Various union benefits, however, are not fu l l y  refl ected in 
statistics of nationa l  income payments. 3 1  Empl oyee benefits, such as 
paid vacat i ons, overtime, and sick  leave, are some fringe benefits not 
accounted for in the share of  nation al i r.come p ayments. Consequentl y ,  
other studies indicate that "the rea l wage rate of l abor has tended to 
rise faster than the rate of. growth i n  productivity, and the rel ative 
share of l abo r in national income has risen at the expense of capital. " 32 
B/Bl oom a nd Northrup , op. cit . ,  p. 509 . 
EB1 oom and Northrup, op. cit. , p .  509. 
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Wh i l e  no de fi nite conclusions can b e  reached, l abor un i ons seem 
to have an infl uence on shortening the time pe riod for wage i ncreasts . 
PERFORt 1ANCE  SU 1�MARY 
Market performance of American l abor unions was studied by 
e xami n i ng market stru cture and conduct which add to or detract from 
des i red public performance goals . Various l abor union characteristi cs 
had d Hfercnt impacts on effi ciency ,  empl oyment , price stabili ty, income 
distr i bution and other publ ic goals . 
Discus s i ons in labor organizations now point toward the desire 
to eli mi nate str i ke s . George Meany (AFL - C IO )  and I . W. Abel  ( S teel ­
workers ) are working for alternatives to costly stri kes. Other union 
official s also have joi ned in these efforts but most proposals create no 
new a pproaches that significantl y  al ter or improve on our  blatant str i ke 
prone  industries. La bor unions not onl y  want to end strikes  to meet 
p ublic goals b ut because strikes h ave al so become too expen sive for all 
part i es .  National concentrated l abor unions suc h  as exh i bited in 
manufacturing industries provi de some assistanc e to the effort of 
devel opir g alternatives to strike s .  Littl e evidence is provided , how­
ever , that conc entrated unions are seeking strike a l ternativ es in a 
greater p roportion than lesser contracted l abor unions. The no-str i ke 
agreement, for instance , originated in the furnitu re industry where 
union membership represents onl y  about 25 percent of the total employ-
ment . 
Labor unions have variou s  criter ia  for wage s ettlements . Large 
uni ons have  e sc a l ator c l a uses wh i c h provide for wage increa ses due 
to change s  i n  �he consumer pri ce i ndex .  Persi stent i ncreases of wages  
due to suc h  a greements seem to s i gna l that i nfl at i onary pressures are 
conti nual l y be i n g fueled. The probl em ·i s  that 1 1 there are no general 
p ri nc i p l e s  determin i ng how large the ( wa ge )  demands s hcul d be at a 
purt i c u l ar t i me, or  what shoul d be the i r speci f ic  c haracter . 1 1 3 3  Thus 
present cr i te ria for ,age settl ements needs a new approach or more 
consi s te nt  guice l i ne s . 
L abor uni on market structure is such that an est i mated 1 50 , 000 
col l e ct i ve bargaini ng  agreements are i n  effect i n  the Uni ted States ;  
of  these , abo u t  twenty uni ons are respon s i bl e  for three quarters of 
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")4 them. � Recent application of wage- price controls unde r Presi dent N ixon 
re:ve · l s  that  l Jbor u n i on s  were wi th i n  t · , e  p res cr ·i bed poli cy r equ i retr.e nts . 
Al so, few maj o r  str i kes occurred during the process . Concentrijted l abor 
unions fol l owed gu i de l i nes  even i f  ser i ous di sagreements  were present. 
Apparently l abor organi zat ion s  can help price stabi l i ty g i ven  proper 
regu l at i on s . Large nat i onal uni ons provi de for the tructure necessary 
to imp l ement and  c ontrol wage increases among u nion workers . 
Union pract i ces i nvolv ing seniority and automa t i on i nfl uence 
effic i ency of  industri es. Some i nd icati ons have been g i ven that re­
s tr i ct i ve work pract i ces do hinder product iv i ty. The wm'kers hardest  
h i t  by automat i on a re b l ue  coll ar workers who are hi g hly u n i on i zed . 
33/ L l oyd Reynol d s , op . ci t . , p . 381 . 
341 B l  ocm a.nd north ru p, op . cit . , p . 390 . 
Th i s  sets  the s tage for pos s i b l e  str i kes i n  a reas such a s  auto 
pro ­
ducti on because of  management deci s i ons to automate. One wo
u l d  there­
fore sus pect that  eff ici ency i s  more curtai l ed i n  manufactu r i
ng i ndus ­
tr i es wh i ch have h i ghl y uni oni zed workers . 
Distri but i on of income i s  a concern of  everyone. Labor
 uni ons 
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have sou ght to achieve wage gains for thei r members wi
thout enough 
regard to employment considerat ions. The pressure h
as been on union 
offici a l s to ach i eve wage g a i ns wi thout adequate 
concern with publ i c  
goal s, s uch a s  empl oyment. Several studies ha
ve indicated a rel at i on ­
shi p between un i oni zation and i ndustrial conc
entrat i ons. However , the 
major i nfl uence o f  l abor uni ons has been to
 increase al l wages. One 
wou l d s us pec a greater un i on i nfl uence on
 wages, but stud i es h ave heen 
confl i ct i ng i n  nature and consequentl y in
decisive in their concl us i on s . 
Descriptions were g i ven that wou l d enhan
ce or achi eve publ i c  
goal s by l abor uni ons. For example , regu l
atory corrmissi ons, special 
l egis l at i on ,  and antitrust laws work to p
rov i de for changes  in market 
performance. "Once we know how these pr
essures on structure and conduct  
a re l ik e l y  to affect performance, te  h
ave a basis for test i n g the wi sdom 
of  these pol i c i es and s u ggest i ng poss
ibl e reforms . 1 1
35 The objecti ve is 
to improve  actual market performance
 by determi n i ng opt i mum potential 
performance 1ith respect to achiev i
ng publ i c  goals. 
Antitrust pol i cy was recommended as  a
 l atter cho i ce for 
E-I R i c h a rd C a ve s , Arr.er i c a n  I n d u s try
:  S tructure , Concuct , Pe r ­
formance ( New Jersey , 1 9 6 7 ), p. 97 . 
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perf ormance goa l s  because l abor unions woul d be or�anized in a d iffe rent 
manner . The brea k-up of national un i on s  through i mpl eme ntation 
of 
antitrust l a�s against union shop  cl ause� woul d prevent l abor 
a suffi­
c ient organizat i on to bargain with l arge industry. The entry 
of  new 
na tional unions  m i ght, however, provide c ompeti tion that ma
y or may not 
be benefi c i al to publ ic goal s. The idea being s tress ed 
is to use l abor 
union structure and regu l ate conduct to meet performan
ce goal s .  I f  such 
a procedure fail s ,  the al ternative may be to use antit
rust to l imit 
national un i ons in negotiating contracts that inv
o l ve a high proportion 
of the total industrial work force or unions th
at are in confl i ct with 
compe titive industrial aspects. The difficul ty
 i n  determi ning criteria 
for l abor u n i on antitrust pol icy is the majo
r factor aoainst i ts app l i-
cation . 
I n  summary, the economic performance of l ab
or unions can be 
assessed from several different points of
 view. As stated ear l ier, 
however, industri al organization theory t
ends to measure economic per­
formance on the bas ·i s of national econom
ic goal s that are in the inter­
est of promoting the general wel fare of
 the pub l ic .  This objective is 
centered on preserving competiti on; h
owever, competition between unions 
and indus try shou l d not be at the ex
pense o f publ ic we l fare i n  the form 
of costly s tr i kes and other behavior
 practices that misal l ocate resources . 
A bal a nce-of-power fostered by the
 market and/or vol untary efforts where 
possi b l e shou l d b e  governmental pol ic
y. However , where compet i t i on i s  
not possib 1 e by s u e  procedures , othe
r �eans  mus t  b e  devel oped to i nsure 
the publ i c  �el fare . Consequentl y ,  go
vernment  needs to strengthen its 
regu l atory p rocedure i n  certai n funct i ons wi th p erformanc
e goa l s made 
more c l ear a nd  a more snti sfactory defi ni t i on o f  re
gu l a t i ng such stan-
dards.  
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Labor uni ons operate under a certa i n  type of struct
ure . Govern -
ment can identify where compet i t i on i s  reduced
 between unions and in-
d ustry . Thus, i dentif i cati on of the probl em a
re a  shoul d be a goal of govern ­
men t poli cy . Competi t i on may then be streng
thened by var i ous ean s such 
a s  a general anti trust poli cy . However, t
hi s ant i trust pol i cy shou l d be 
con s i dered as a l atter al ternat i ve. 
Another area of governmental concern is 
l abor unions ctnd indl's-
trial conduct . Competiti on i n  the form
 of  cost l y stri kes is ot neces­
sary. Once the spec i fic $trike p rcnc s
�ctors a re l ocated , s tr i ke 
0 l ter­
n ati ve s  can be devel oped for the i nte
rested part i es. Th i s  wou l d  enhance 
collect i ve b a rga i n i ng and also nat i ona
l e conom i c goal s. Governmeht mu st 
deal , i th ins t i tut i ons such as l abor 
unions and industry in order to 
impl ement economic goal s .  
CHAPTER V 
· suMMARY 
Th i s  research paper has anal yzed some factors deal i n g with l
abor 
uni ons ' structure, conduct, and performance. Chang i ng economi
c con­
d i t i ons have brought about concentrated uni ons. Concentr
ated l abor 
uni ons have different pol icy options ava i l ab 1 e compared 
to a l ess " con­
centrated ' '  uni on .  Large l abor uni ons have certain ty
pes of conduct wh i ch 
may or may not be benefici al to publ i c  goal s. The L
abor uni ons have 
a substanti al economi c rol e in  our market system
. Anal ysi s of this rol e 
wi th respect to economi c  performance provides a b
ase for i dent i fy ing 
probl em areas and recommend i ng i mprovements. Sp
ec i f i c  findings of this 
study about Amer i can l abor uni ons i ncl ude the f
ol l ow ing in regards to 
uni ons ' structure, conduct, and performance
s: 
1. Uni on membership has decl i ned as a propor
ti on of the total 
l abor force . 
2. There is an increasing proport i on of b l
ue col l ar workers 
under col l ecti ve bargaini ng agreements and 
union control .  
3 .  Nati onal l abor unions h ave siani ficant
 control over l ocal s 
i n  mul tiuni t bargaining procedures
. 
4. Stri kes have invol ved greater costs 
even though the percentage 
of total work ing t i me l ost due to stri kes
 has decreased. 
5 .  Nat i onal union finances are be i ng sp
ent in l arge amounts 
for pol i t i cal purposes. 
6 .  Legal l i mitati ons have prevented reg u
l ating l abor unions 
by antitrust l aws . 
7 .  D i fferi ng degree s of uni on power ha
ve been exhib ited  i n  
vari ous industrial sectors . 
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8. A g reater governmental ro l e i s  nece s sary i n  wage s ettl e­
ments and  s tr i ke a l ternatives . 
9. Confl i cts e x i st between government goal s of control l i n g  
i nfl ati on, emp l oyment, and a free l abor ma rket. 
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Gove rnment has, to a l arge extent, a l l owed the labor market to 
s ecure i ts own balance-of- power for peacef�l i ndustr i a l  rel ation s . The 
propo s i t i on d eve l oped by \John Kenneth Ga 1 bra i th is  that, 'in the economy , 
the re i s  not much competiti on, but that, a s  a monopol y threatens to 
grow, it i s  l i mi ted  by the development of a counte rva i li ng power .  I n  
other word s , b i g bus i ness  l eRds to big l abor uni ons  to offset each 
others  power .  Thus,  b i g bu s i ne s s  and labor unions prov i de for coMpe ­
t i t i on in the l abor ma rket � However , government must i nsure that the 
publ i c  1 s  he i ng repre sented  i n  ba rga i n i n g  agreements . H i gh  wa ges and 
costs must not be conti nuously passed  on to the  publ i c  in a form of 
h i ghe r p r i ces  w i thout regards to i nfl ation. Str i kes  are too costl y in 
terms of bene f i ts l ost. 
The opportun i ty costs that would h ave been der i ved from employ-
ment of a factor of pro ucti on i s  l ost  due  to s tr i ke s. A factor s uch a s  
labor w i t hhel d from the ma rket can never be regained . Government has a 
sufficient interest to i mplement "Med-Arb 1 1 of the Fede ral Med i at ion 
Stud i es a re be i ng done to s ee the impact of p art i cu l ar  wage 
i ncrea s e s  on pri ce s. Cons equently, government can provide med i ati on 
a s s i stance i n  wage determi nat i on to i ndu stries wh i ch do n ot comply wi th 
inflation pol i cy. The next paragraphs  w i ll examine where  counterva ili ng  
power fos tered by the mar�et doe s not meet publ i c  goa l s but re sul ts  i n  
vmrk  stop pages . 
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Work stoppage s that i nconvenien ce the publ i c  bri ng forth out­
cries for antitru st l aws . However, major strikes occur  in manu
facturing 
i ndustri es due to the bal ance-of- power pol icy promoted b y  the 
market. 
Fo e xampl e ,  manufacturin g sectors are associated with con
centrated 
union s and firms . The competi tion between them in col l ec
tive barga in ing 
can be such that both union and f i rms strong l y resist 
any demands. 
Con sequentl y, the ba l an ce-of-power pol icy provides fo
r equity in bar­
gain i ng but at the expense of strikes. Therefore, 
a re-examination of 
l abor and industry pol icy is necessary . 
An approach to changing the b al an ce of power 
between union and 
fi rms is the appl ication of antitrust l aws . 
This wou l d prevent unions 
from con sol idatin g i nto fewer and l arger  uni
on s .  Recent  attempts to 
un i te the bul k  of te l ephone and postal emp
l oyees  into one unit of more 
than 800 , 000 members might be prevented be
cause of antitrust i mpl ication s . 
However, l egisl ative acts and Supreme Cou
rt cases reveal strict l imitations  
t o  an y antitru st appl ications to unions.
 The basic premise is that l arge 
unions are so greatl y integrated into ou
r e conomic system that con cen­
trated union s are necessary for the l abo
r morket to operate successful l y . 
F urthe rmor8 : any appl ication of ant i tru
st can be too incl usive . 
Each i ndus try is u .  i que as to the unio
ns .  A break- up of unions in 
tnanufacturing wil l prevent prol onged 
strikes. However, unions cannot 
ef fectivel y negotiate with l arge ma
nufacturing firms un l e ss unions · 
pos s e ss a con centrated bargaining orga
niz ation . Labor u nions must be 
abl e to subs ' dize a worker ' s in come
 in case of a strike ; workers �ust be 
abl e to meet the ir expend iture s  for foo
d , hou sing, and other necessitite s . 
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Consequentl y �  tre�enctous expendi ture s are necessary i n order to m
ai ntai n 
fami l ies. The si ze of a worker's income i s  much l arger now . Th
erefore, 
unions need a substanti a l  organizati on to f i nance a possi bl e str
i ke . 
Antitrust woul d resul t i n  fewer stri kes at the expense of work
ers. 
Cl earl y ,  the i mpact of ant i trust pol i cy wi l l  vary among 
d i ffer-
ent unions. Non-manufacturi ng sectors i n  whi ch uni on work
ers have as 
high  or higher wage increases than manufacturing worke
rs wil l affect 
their respective firms d i fferentl y. G reater competit
i on i n  non-manu­
facturing sectors between union and firms may resul t 
in more stri kes. 
The change in union structure has mul t i pl e  effects
 on the market.  
I ndustry then has d i fferent degrees of bargaini ng
 power i n  deal i ng wi th 
nat i ona l un i ons .  
Government control neverthel ess seems i nev i ta
bl e as unions grow 
and expand thei r economi c powers. 
1 1 The approach util izi ng speci f i c l aws 
or secti ons , or secti ons thereof , to attack
 specifi c  union abuses wi l l  
be seen to be more sati sfactory than woul d
 a general i zed approach 
throug h  the anti trust l aw . 1 1
36 Such a procedure al l ows government the 
opportuni ty to approach uni ons on a case-b
y-case basis. Moreover,  
government goal s can be assessed as to re
stri cti ve work practi ces , 
empl oyment , strikes ,  or infl ati on consi de
rati ons . Consequentl y , govern­
ment pol icy which gui des uni on and firm 
performance yiel ds a more 
acceptabl e program because both l abor a
nd management find such a proposal 
1§/s1 oom and Northrup, Economi c s  of La bor Rel ati ons ( I l l i noi s ,  
1965) , p. 284 . 
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acceptabl e .  
T h u s, government pol i cy d i rected toward i nfl a t ion can be 
spec i f i c in i ts appl i cati on .  Certa i n  sectors su ch  as non
-manufacturi ng 
and non-durab l e  goods c an  be moni tored as to the i mpa
ct of wage i n ­
creas es on  pri ces . Al so, price i ncreases and thei r effect
 on variou s  
i ndexes i n  these sectors prov i de va l uabl e i nformatio
n as  to i nfl at ion. 
The probl em i s, however, to ma i nta i n h i gh empl oyme
nt , stab l e p rices, a nd 
a free l abor market. These goal s confl ict wi t h  
each  oth er .  A l abor 
market w i thout governmenta l  control over wages 
and pri ces resu l ts i n  
d i fficul ties i n  mainta i ni ng pri ce ri ses . Any
 wage-pri c e  gu i del i nes, on 
the other h and,  woul d cause probl ems i n  regu
l at i ng .  A new government 
agency orga n i zing e cunomi c depa r L11 1"nts u 1 1Jer 
a centi ·a 1 i zeJ sys tern i s  
needed . Thi s agency woul d provide coordi na
ti on i n  e conomic pol icy 
rather t han t he patchwork system wh i ch is
 now being admi ni stered. 
Un i o n  and i ndustry conseq uentl y spend mi
l l ions of dol l ars to 
el ect t heir candidates to i nfl uence go
vernment pol i cy .  Union interest 
i n  pol i t i ca l  dec i si ons s tems from its ob
l i g at ions to i ts workers . For 
exampl e, the u ni on phi l osophy is that 
deprec iati on of the h uman mach i ne 
shoul d  be accompl i shed si mi l arl y to 
the deprec i at i on of cap i tal equip­
�nt . I n  other words, hea l th ,  retire
ment, and vacat i on programs shou l d 
al l ow for expend i tures i n  amort i zi ng h
uman cost i n  a manner simi l a r to 
c ap i tal costs. The probl em i s  whethe
r i nd ustry or government wi l l  
p rov i de th i s type of coverage .  I ndu s
trial program_ are l ac king i n  their 
coverage of workers. Some wo kers ha  
e excel l ent  programs , whil e other 
workers l ac k  necessary c overages. The  n
ationa l government cou l d prov i de 
a bette r ba se  for a compl ete system coveri n g  a l l c i rcums tances . How
­
ever, governmental e xpans i on i nto s oci al pro grams create s probl ems .· 
Government i ncreases in spending wil l eventual l y lead to ris i ng taxes 
and g reate r bureaucracy. Government wil l  also  face a gro\,ting inter­
vent i on by labor uni ons into politics to influence p rograms benef
i c i al 
to the h·· worker s . I n  othe r word s , government invo 1 ' ement in wo
rke rs ' 
welfare programs w ill n ece s s i tate more pol i tical act i v i t i e s b
y u ni on s . 
ihe s pend i ng by uni ons for poli t i cal cand i dates already co
nfirms the 
1 1 1  
grow i ng  rol e  o f  un i ons i n  politics. Yet , a recent Gallu
p Pol l suggests 
that peopl e want i ndependent f i nanc i ng of p res i dent i a
l  and co�gres sional 
cand i dates.  Peopl e want the poli t i ca l sys tem separ
ated from d i rect 
s n°nd i ng of l arge un i ons and firms . Thi s confl i ct
 f va l ue s  co u l rl  
clearly a ffect uni on infl uence _in the po l i t i cal en
v i ronmen t. 
This s tudy has i dentif i ed some key labor union
 character i s tics 
that i nfluence the o perat i on of  our market econo
my . Labor union struc­
ture, c onduct , a 1 1d performance were elaborated 
upon and e xpl ored wi th i n  
the l i mi t s  o f  t i me and i nformat i on available .
 Whi le many of  the con­
clus i ons  and recommendati ons are tentat i ve, 
they do po i nt out  the need 
for answers a nd further research, and rai s
e d i ffi c ult qu es t i ons about 
our  labor  marke t system. The s u bj ect matt
er  i s  a vas t one and con­
s i derabl y more re search is needed to improv
e our knowledge o f  labor 
u n i ons . T h i s  s tudy has attempted to : 
( 1 )  add to that knowledge , 
e s peci a l ly from an economi c po i nt of v i e
w ,  and ( 2 ) apply a body of 
economic theory that has prev i ou sly been mos
t  o r i ented toward analyz i ng 
i n dus try pe rf orwance . 
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